Événements

Avr
27
sam
2024
Dimensions of Gratitude Workshop @ UQÀM, Pavilon Thérèse-Casgrain, local W-5215
Avr 27 @ 9:30 – 17:00

Colloque organisé par Max Lewis (Yale) aidé de Christopher Howard (McGill) et de Mauro Rossi (UQÀM) sous l’égide du CRÉ, avec le soutien du Canadian Journal of Philosophy, du GRIN, du GRIPP et du Département de philosophie de l’UQÀM.

Horaire

9:30-9:40       Welcome

9:40-11:00     Julia Driver (UT Austin), “Misplaced Gratitude”
Commentary by Alex Carty (McGill)

11:00-11:10   Break

11:10-12:30   Arash Abizadeh (McGill), “Sorry, not Sorry: The Practice of Conditional Apologies”
Commentary by Guillaume Soucy (UQAM)

12:30-2:00     Lunch

2:10-3:30       Max Lewis (Yale), “The Annulment Thesis and The Dynamics of Gratitude”
Commentary by Melissa Hernandez Parra (UdeM)

3:30-4:00       Coffee Break

4:00-5:00       Stephen Darwall (Yale), “’Much obliged’: On Gratitude and Obligation”
Commentary by Jordan Walters (McGill)

Mai
15
mer
2024
Richard Healey (LSE) @ Salle 309, mode hybride
Mai 15 @ 12:00 – 13:30
Richard Healey (LSE) @ Salle 309, mode hybride

Nous recevrons Richard Healey (LSE) dans le cadre des conférences du midi du CRÉ. Richard nous présentera ses travaux sur les promesses immorales.

Pour y participer par Zoom, c’est ici.

La présentation sera donnée en anglais, mais les questions pourront être posées en anglais ou en français.

Résumé

It is a familiar part of common-sense morality that we are duty bound to keep our promises. However, the creative nature of promissory duties – the fact that the promisor and promisee choose the content of the promises they make – prompts a natural question: Are there substantive constraints on the content of the promises we can make? For instance, can we make binding promises to murder, maim, and steal? Many have the intuition that such promises fail to bind. Taking this intuition as my starting point, this paper develops a novel account of the nature and explanation of the constraints that apply to our power to promise. Most existing views attempt to explain these constraints by appeal to independent duties to which the promisor or promisee are subject. Yet while initially appealing, these views struggle to achieve extensional adequacy, and lack a clear rationale. On the account that I develop, we should instead appeal to the values that underpin the power to promise itself. I argue that a promise creates a form of special relationship between promisor and promisee, and the constraints that apply to that power track the value of this promissory relationship.