Events

May
6
Mon
2024
GRIN Graduate Fellow’s Conference @ Room W-5215, Department of philosophy, UQAM
May 6 – May 7 all-day
GRIN Graduate Fellow's Conference @ Room W-5215, Department of philosophy, UQAM
The event will begin on May 6th with a talk by Katarina Nieswandt of Concordia University entitled What Is a Common Good?, and will continue on May 7th with a talk by Marc-Kevin Daoust of the École de technologie supérieure entitled Rationalité substantive, rationalité procédurale et approximation des idéaux.

To participate via Zoom, click here.

Program:

DAY I – Monday / May 6 2024                                                                                                                                                             

Time Lenght Chair Présentations et commentaires
10h00-10h50 50 min Aude Bandini Katarina Nieswandt (Concordia)

What Is a Common Good?

10h50-11h00 10 min BREAK
11h00-11h30 30 min Karl-Antoine Pelchat Léonard Bédard (ULaval)

Brouiller la frontière pour mieux exclure. Réflexion critique sur le droit d’exclusion territoriale exercé à l’encontre des réfugié-e-s en contexte canadien

Commentary: Gilles Beauchamp

11h30-12h00 30 min Véronique Armstrong (UdeM)

Vers un écoholisme cynique : comment favoriser les touts écologiques dans un contexte de prédation ?

12h00-13h00 60 min LUNCH
13h00-13h30 30 min Alejandro Macías Flores Emmanuel Cuisinier (UdeM)

Perception, Heroism, and The Problem of Expression in Merleau-Ponty

Commentary: Alejandro Macías Flores

13h30-14h00 30 min Pascal-Olivier Dumas-Dubreuil (UdeM)

Phénoménologie linguistique, mutisme des sens et normativité chez John L. Austin

Commentary: Alejandro Macías Flores

14h00-14h10 10 min BREAK
14h10-14h40 30 min Karl-Antoine Pelchat Guillaume Soucy (UQAM)

Une caractérisation constructiviste du point de vue esthétique

14h40-15h10 30 min Frédéric Beaulac (UdeM)

Est-ce que les certitudes basiques sont des connaissances?

Commentary: Guillaume Soucy

15h10-15h20 10 min PAUSE
15h20-15h50 30 min Alex Carty Alexis Morin-Martel (McGill)

Trust as a Respectful Attitude

Commentary: Alex Carty

15h50-16h20 30min Samuel Carlsson Tjernström (McGill)

Why We Cannot Gnostically Wrong

Commentary: Karl-Antoine Pelchat

 

DAY II – Tuesday, May 7 2024                                                                                                                                                                

PÉRIODE DURÉE ANIMATION PRÉSENTATIONS ET COMMENTAIRES
10h00-10h50 50 min Aude Bandini Marc-Kevin Daoust (ÉTS)

Rationalité substantive, rationalité procédurale et approximation des idéaux

10h50-11h00 10 min BREAK
11h00-11h30 30 min Karl-Antoine Pelchat Michaël Lemelin (UQAM)

Une production moindre peut-elle nuire à l’égalité politique ?

11h30-12h00 30 min Alexandre Poisson (UQAM)

Conceptual Import and Interdisciplinarity: Epistemic Contributions of Feminist Philosophy, Critical Race Theory, and Critical Disability Studies to Animal Ethics

12h00-13h00 60 min LUNCH
13h00-13h30 30 min Félix Tremblay Vincent Rochelle (ULaval)

Transition émotionnelle et formation du groupe : le deuil comme exemple du paradoxe de l’émotion collective diachronique

13h30-14h00 30 min Ellena Thibaud Latour (UdeM)

Undone Science et santé des femmes : politique de l’ignorance et injustices structurelles

Commentary : Laurence Dufour-Villeneuve

14h00-14h10 10 min PAUSE
14h10-14h40 30 min Alex Carty Jingzhi Chen (McGill)

Being a Good Friend and a Good Believer

14h40-15h10 30 min Mingqiu Xue (McGill)

Epistemic Impartiality in Friendship

Commentary : Jingzhi Chen

May
15
Wed
2024
Richard Healey (LSE) @ Room 309, hybrid
May 15 @ 12:00 – 13:30
Richard Healey (LSE) @ Room 309, hybrid

We’re delighted to welcome Richard Healey (LSE) for a lunch talk on immoral promises.

To participate via Zoom, click here.

Abstract

It is a familiar part of common-sense morality that we are duty bound to keep our promises. However, the creative nature of promissory duties – the fact that the promisor and promisee choose the content of the promises they make – prompts a natural question: Are there substantive constraints on the content of the promises we can make? For instance, can we make binding promises to murder, maim, and steal? Many have the intuition that such promises fail to bind. Taking this intuition as my starting point, this paper develops a novel account of the nature and explanation of the constraints that apply to our power to promise. Most existing views attempt to explain these constraints by appeal to independent duties to which the promisor or promisee are subject. Yet while initially appealing, these views struggle to achieve extensional adequacy, and lack a clear rationale. On the account that I develop, we should instead appeal to the values that underpin the power to promise itself. I argue that a promise creates a form of special relationship between promisor and promisee, and the constraints that apply to that power track the value of this promissory relationship.