Dans le cadre des conférences du midi du CRÉ, Julia D. Hur (NYU) nous offrira une présentation intitulée « Money on Mind: Performance Incentive, Attention to Money, Environmental Sustainability ».
Pour y participer via Zoom, c’est ici.
Résumé
Environmental sustainability is one of the most pressing problems of our time, raising significant questions as to how to motivate organizational decision-makers to make substantive investments in environmental protection. The current work identifies performance incentives as a critical barrier that prevents organizational decision-makers from supporting sustainability initiatives. We also offer a novel psychological mechanism of how monetary incentives activate managers’ attentional fixation on money, intensifies their zero-sum mindset, and ultimately undermines commitment to investing in sustainability. Across two laboratory experiments (n = 702) and one archival study with a combination of data on executive compensation, corporate annual reports, and environmental performance (n = 14,126), we show that decision-makers whose pay is more contingent on financial performances are more likely to develop attentional fixation on money and less likely to support sustainability initiatives of their organization. Together, our findings demonstrate a novel pathway of how one of the most prevalently used types of financial incentives inadvertently undermine progress toward one of the most urgent organizational changes.
Dans le cadre des activités du Réseau de philosophie du travail, Lisa Herzog (UGroeningen) offrira une présentation intitulée: « Labor Markets without Market Wages ».
Les activités du Réseau de philosophie du travail sont ouvertes aux chercheur.es et aux étudiant.es diplômé.es ayant des intérêts de recherche dans ce domaine. Merci d’écrire aux organisateurs, Denise Celentano (denise.celentano@umontreal.ca) et Pablo Gilabert (pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca), pour recevoir le lien zoom.
Résumé
Should wages be determined by market forces? This paper argues against this view, based on consideration of the kind of good that labor is and what it means to “trade” it. Two arguments brought forward in favor of market wages, the desert argument and the information argument, are not only mutually incompatible but also both not convincing. The first founders on the problem of complementarities in value creation. The second fails not only because of endogeneity problems, but also because of systemic market failures in labor markets. But is it possible to give up labor markets without endangering freedom of occupation or risking problematic degrees of inefficiency? This can be achieved by understanding labor markets as matching markets, comparable to those for donor organs: what matters is creating good matches, but the price mechanism is not central for this. From this perspective, various existing institutions, such as minimum wages and collective bargaining, can be reinterpreted as “approximative institutions” that move labor markets in a more just direction.
