Past events
Calendar archives
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As part of the activities of the Philosophy of Work Network, Joshua Preiss (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) will offer a presentation entitled: “The Moral and Political Importance of Good Jobs”. To attend the talk, click here.
The activities of the Philosophy of Work Network are open to researchers and graduate students with research interests in this area. They are organized by Denise Celentano (denise.celentano@umontreal.ca) and Pablo Gilabert (pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca).
Abstract: This paper connects the political, business, and policy discourse on good jobs with recent philosophy of work, bringing philosophical analysis to bear on a defining moral and political challenge for our time. My teleological account of good jobs provides a normative lens for understanding the economic transformations of wealthy democratic societies the past half century, the crisis of liberal democracy that has resulted from these transformations, and what, at minimum, needs to be done about it. Good jobs, on this account, enable workers to cross a context-relevant threshold of compensation, status, and power. In addition, I argue that a focus on good jobs does not entail fetishizing paid work or endorsing the proliferation of so-called bullshit jobs (despite the fact that the later often provide significant compensation, status, and power). Even those who envision a future with little to no paid labor can recognize a basic moral and political imperative: restoring the promise that through hard work people can build a better life for themselves, their families, and their communities. Good jobs provide the fuel for democratic norms and institutions and give ordinary workers the power they’ll need to secure a free and inclusively prosperous future with less paid work.
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“Citizenship beyond sedentariness” @ Room 309, CRÉ, hybrid mode
12 h 00 – 13 h 15
As part of the CRÉ Midis de l’éthique Series, Anna Milioni will present a talk entitled ‘Citizenship beyond Sedentariness.’
To join via Zoom, click here.
Abstract
A powerful argument against the exclusion of migrants from citizenship rights suggests that this exclusion leads to the formation of a political underclass that undermines equality within the state. In response to this critique, it is often argued that citizenship is permissibly exclusionary. Political communities, the argument goes, have a right to determine who gets access to citizenship, at least within certain limits: while it is generally considered impermissible to exclude people on the basis of their racial identity, ethnic origin, or social class, access to citizenship can permissibly be conditional upon the fulfillment of other requirements, such as a minimum period of residence or a citizenship test. This paper scrutinizes three supposedly innocuous requirements for naturalisation: minimum residence requirements, citizenship tests set at a modest level of difficulty, and loyalty oaths. I hold that these conditions only seem innocuous insofar as we assume that people are predominantly sedentary, and that even people who migrate ultimately settle in their new state of residence. Yet, these assumptions have been criticised as being both empirically mistaken and potentially exclusionary toward those who do not fall within the sedentary paradigm. Taking this critique seriously, I show that minimum residence requirements (section 1), citizenship tests (section 2), and loyalty oaths (section 3) only seem
to be innocuous because of these background assumptions of sedentariness. Once we drop the assumption that people who migrate settle permanently in their new state of residence, and we switch our focus to the many ways in which people can be mobile, these conditions cease to appear permissible. I begin by bringing to the fore various types of mobile migrants, i.e., migrants who do not have the intention and/or the legal right to settle permanently in their current state of residence. This focus on mobility allows me to show how each of these conditions rely on assumptions of sedentariness that prevent various types of mobile migrants from accessing citizenship (sections 1-3). I then argue that residence requirements, citizenship tests, and loyalty oaths violate are impermissible, as they violate two standardly accepted conditions for exclusionary migration policies: that they are publicly justifiable to migrants and that they are not discriminatory (section 4). In the final section, I explore the implications of my argument for citizenship (section 5). -
RESCHEDULED – “Le fossé de responsabilité dans le contexte des systèmes artificiels” @ Room 309, CRÉ, hybrid
12 h 00 – 13 h 15
As part of the Ethics Lunchtime Series, Thomas Emmaüs Adetou will present his work on the responsibility gap in the context of artificial systems.
The event, originally scheduled for 10 December 2024, has been postponed.
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“Roland Barthes on the Epistemic Demands of Love” @ Room 309, CRÉ, hybrid
12 h 00 – 13 h 15
As part of the Ethics Lunchtime series, Nick Clanchy will give a presentation titled “Roland Barthes on the Epistemic Demands of Love.”
To join via Zoom, click here.
Photo by Ulf Andersen/Getty Images.
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“Penser le corps en féministe. L’expérience vécue du corps enceint” by Camille Froidevaux-Metterie @ Carrefour des arts et des sciences (salle C-3061, pav. Lionel-Groulx), Université de Montréal
12 h 30 – 14 h 30
Dans le cadre du cours Philosophie féministe (PHI 2419), enseigné par Cécile Gagnon, le Centre de Recherche en Éthique a le plaisir de vous convier à une conférence de Camille Froidevaux-Metterie, le vendredi 29 novembre, à 12h30 au Carrefour des arts et des sciences (salle C-3061, pav. Lionel-Groulx) intitulée Penser le corps en féministe. L’expérience vécue du corps enceint.
Camille Froidevaux-Metterie est une philosophe, romancière et professeure de science politique.Ses travaux portent sur les transformations de la condition féminine à l’époque contemporaine, dans une perspective phénoménologique qui place la question du corps au centre de la réflexion. Celle-ci est axée sur la réappropriation par les femmes de leur corps telle qu’elle s’exprime dans les mouvements récents de la lutte féministe portant sur des enjeux liés à l’intime et à la génitalité féminine.
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As part of the activities of the Philosophy of Work Network, Jan Kandiyali (Durham University) and Barry Maguire (University of Edinburgh) will offer a presentation entitled: “Socialism and Collective Ownership of the Means of Production”.
The activities of the Philosophy of Work Network are open to researchers and graduate students with research interests in this area. Please write to the organizers, Denise Celentano (denise.celentano@umontreal.ca) and Pablo Gilabert (pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca), to receive the zoom link.
Abstract
Historically, socialism has been identified with collective ownership of the means of production. However, in the face of the failure of central planning, and influential arguments about the necessity of markets and private ownership, many contemporary socialists have sought to sever the link between socialism and collective ownership. The socialists we have in mind define socialism exclusively in terms of a set of values, usually some form of robust equality of opportunity, and then see the question of what form of economic organisation realises those values as entirely separate. In this paper, we reject this decoupling of socialism from collective ownership. Our argument has two steps. In the first, we outline an important but nowadays underappreciated value, namely that of solidarity or mutual care, understood as the positive counterpart to productive alienation, and argue that this, rather than robust equality of opportunity, is the heart of the socialist ideal. The ideal of solidarity is one in which we all care about one another, and care that we care about one another. In the second, we show that solidarity is partly constituted by collective ownership of the means of production.
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Miklós István Zala (Aarhus University) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid
12 h 00 – 13 h 30
The CRÉ is pleased to welcome Miklós István Zala (Aarhus University), who will be giving a presentation titled ‘Justice and Social Responsibility for Causing Disability Disadvantage.’ The event will be moderated by Hugo Cossette Lefebvre (Aarhus University). The presentation will last approximately 40 minutes and will be followed by a general discussion.
To participate via Zoom, click here.
AbstractThe social model of disability holds that society makes people with impairments disabled; that is, the social model makes a causal claim. However, some commentators are skeptical about the usefulness of the social model’s causal analysis (see Samaha 2007). Sean Aas and David Wasserman (2016) provide a forceful argument for why such a causal analysis is important: if society causes disability disadvantage, eliminating or mitigating such disadvantage has a higher priority vis-à-vis other disadvantages society did not cause. Their starting point is Nagel’s 1997 paper “Justice and Nature.” Nagel holds that society is not responsible for those disadvantages it did not cause. While Aas and Wasserman acknowledge that Nagel’s essay makes steps in the right direction regarding social responsibility, they rightly reject his radical narrowing of the purview of justice. They especially disagree with Nagel that society bears no responsibility for disadvantages if they are the unintended results of justifiable projects whose mitigation would be costly.Aas and Wasserman lay down an alternative conception of social responsibility. They provide four criteria for when society is responsible for disadvantage. One of these states that society is responsible for a disadvantage if and only if the given disadvantage results from societal policies, which “in the course of making some better off, foreseeably make others, who have some claim to a justification of those policies, worse off.” Just like Nagel, Aas and Wasserman approach the question of just and unjust disadvantages from a tort law perspective—foreseeability as a responsibility-limiting factor is familiar from the tort law literature on “proximate cause.” However, this literature makes it clear that using foreseeability as a responsibility-limiting factor can be problematic. Sometimes, agents are not responsible for disadvantages they can foresee and can be held responsible for causing disadvantages they did not foresee. Using the example of inaccessible public infrastructure, I argue that there are instances when the foreseeability criterion should be replaced with strict liability for causing unforeseeable disadvantages. In other instances, social actors are at fault for not foreseeing the caused disadvantages. As I aim to show in the paper, which of these cases applies depends on the available epistemic resources of agents in charge of providing access. -
CANCELLED – ‘Cette femme qui nous regarde. Angela Davis, l’Amérique et moi’ (Robert Laffont, 2024) @ Room 309, CRE, hybrid mode
12 h 00 – 13 h 30
Brice Arsène Mankou sits down with Alain Mabanckou, author of Cette femme qui nous regarde. Angela Davis, l’Amérique et moi (Robert Laffont, 2024).
To join via Zoom, click here.
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About the Edge of Sentience @ Room 1201, Department of Equity, Ethics & Health
16 h 00 – 17 h 30
The CRÉ is pleased to invite you to a book roundtable on Jonathan Birch’s The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI (Oxford University Press, 2024).
Speakers:
Jonathan Birch (London School of Economics)
Stevan Harnard (Université du Québec à Montréal)
Jonathan Kimmelman (McGill)
Martin Gibert (Université de Montréal/CRÉ)
Chair: Virginie Simoneau-Gilbert (University of Oxford)
Book summary:
Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs, shrimps, insects or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain, grown from human stem cells? What about AI?
These are questions about the edge of sentience, and they are subject to enormous, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough?
The Edge of Sentience presents a precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty.
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Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool) @ Université du Québec à Montréal
10 h 00 – 12 h 00
On Friday, November 8, 2024, from 10:00AM to 12:00PM, Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool) will offer a lecture entitled “Doing Your Own (Patient Activist) Research”, organized by the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN).
The event will take place in room DS-1950 of Pavilion J.-A. De Sève, at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), 320 Sainte-Catherine Street East. The conference will also be presented on Zoom.
This talk is about the author’s work in progress. If you wish to access the article in question, please contact us at grin.normativity@gmail.com.
Abstract
The slogan “Do Your Own Research” (DYOR) is often invoked by people who are distrustful, even downright sceptical, of recognized expert authorities. While this slogan may serve various rhetorical purposes, it also expresses an ethic of inquiry that valorises independent thinking and rejects uncritical deference to recognized experts. This paper is a qualified defence of this ethic of inquiry in one of the central contexts in which it might seem attractive. I use several case studies of patient activist groups to argue that these groups often engage in valuable independent research that advances biomedical knowledge. In doing so they demonstrate the value of “lay expertise” and the epistemic as well as political necessity of not simply deferring to recognized experts. I also give some reasons why patient activist groups often produce valuable biomedical knowledge: they are examples of what I call “research collectives”. Research collectives are research communities that differ from the traditional research communities we find in universities and research institutes in that their members typically lack formal relevant scientific credentials and training. But they are similar in that they have internal structures—training procedures, norms of discussion, venues for holding discussions—that facilitate the production of knowledge. I finish by suggesting that future research into the differences and similarities between research collectives and traditional research communities is required.
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Mariam Thalos (University of Tennessee) @ McGill University
10 h 00 – 12 h 00
On Friday, November 1, 2024, from 10:00AM to 12:00PM, Mariam Thalos (University of Tennessee) will give a lecture entitled “Reasoning in Context”.
The event will take place in Room 738 of the Leacock Building, located at 855 Sherbrooke Street, McGill University. To participate via Zoom, click here.
The conference is organized by the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN).
Abstract
The concept of intelligence has been difficult to get one’s arms around. Surprisingly, the same can be said also of the notion of reasoning. This talk aims at shedding some light on certain aspects of human reasoning – reasoning for practical life. This will put us in a better position to make some comparisons between (some aspects of) human reasoning, and what Large Language Models (LLMs) are doing – they look to be doing quite different things. Reasoning, at least as humans do it, involves architecture that Computer Science has apparently abandoned for the current generation of AI models. By articulating an account of the machinery required for reasoning, we will be able to pose questions about how human reasoning operates collective settings as well as in individual settings.
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Mary Kate McGowan (Wellesley College) @ McGill University
15 h 00 – 17 h 00
On Monday, October 28, 2024, from 3:00PM to 5:00PM, Mary Kate McGowan (Wellesley College) will offer a lecture entitled “On Silencing, Miscommunication, and Silence”.
The seminar will take place in Room 927 of the Leacock Building, located at 855 Sherbrooke street, McGill University.
The event is co-sponsored by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ) and McGill’s Department of Philosophy.
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On Wednesday, October 23, 2024, from 12:00PM to 1:30PM, Emily M. Bender (University of Washington) will give a seminar entitled “Sense-making with artificial interlocutors and risks of language technology”, for the Doctorate in Cognitive Computing (DIC) program at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM).
To participate via Zoom, click here.
The seminar is co-sponsored by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ), in collaboration with the Cognitive Science Institute (ISC), the Doctorate in Cognitive Computing (DIC) program, and the Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence (CRIA) at UQÀM.
Abstract
Humans make sense of language in context, bringing to bear their own understanding of the world, including their own model of their interlocutor’s understanding of the world. In this talk, I will explore various potential risks that arise when humans bring this sense-making capacity to interactions with artificial interlocutors. What happens in conversations where one interlocutor has no access (or extremely limited access) to meaning and all the interpretative work instead rests with the other interlocutor? I will briefly explore what this entails for the design of language technology.
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Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna College) @ Université du Québec à Montréal
15 h 00 – 17 h 00
Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna College) will give a presentation entitled “Standpoint Epistemology – Social or Applied?” at the Université du Québec à Montréal.
Registration is required. Information about the room and exact location of the presentation will provided after registering via the following link.
The event is co-organized by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ) and the Canada Research Chair on Epistemic Injustice and Agency.
Abstract
As a standpoint epistemologist, I have sometimes been called an “applied epistemologist”. But is this characterization of standpoint epistemology correct? On the surface, one might think the distinction is insignificant. But I argue that the interpretation of standpoint epistemology as an applied epistemology serves an important ideological purpose: it preserves an epistemological landscape wherein mainstream, or traditional epistemology, is the default theory of knowledge. This in turn diminishes some of the central insights of standpoint epistemology, most notably those that represent standpoint epistemology as an alternative to classical theory, or demand a revision of key components of traditional epistemology.
This paper aims to accomplish two tasks: first, to show that standpoint epistemology, though a social epistemology, is not an applied epistemology. I’ll then argue that classical epistemology is social in many of the same ways that standpoint epistemology is – it merely hides this fact. In epistemology, traditional epistemology holds pride of place. It maintains this grip on the field primarily through the devaluation of alternatives, like standpoint theory. By clarifying the relationship between the social and applied, as well as between traditional and standpoint, I hope to de-center traditional epistemology, and to reposition it as but one theory among many.
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Hugues-Leblanc Conference 2024: Simon Caney on Climate Justice @ Université du Québec à Montréal
10 Oct 15 h 30 – 11 Oct 15 h 30
The Departement of philosophy at UQAM invites you to the 2024 Hugues-Leblanc lectures, October 10th-11th, room W-5215.
Guest speaker Prof. SIMON CANEY (Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick) will deliver three lectures on the theme: CLIMATE JUSTICE
Schedule:
“What Kind of Climate Duties Do We Have to Future Generations?”
Thursday, October 10th, 15:30-17:30 (Eastern Standard Time)
Commentator: Éric Pineault (UQAM)
“What is a Just Transition to a Sustainable World?”
Frisday, October 11th, 10h00-12h00 (Eastern Standard Time)
Commentator: Dominique Leydet (UQAM)
“Political Responsibilities to Tackle Climate Change”
Vendredi 11 octobre, 13h30-15h30 (Eastern Standard Time)
Commentator: Matthias Fritsch (Concordia)
All activities will take place in person, room W-5215 (UQAM, Departement of philosophy, 455 Boulevard René-Lévesque Est, Montréal, Québec, Canada). Refreshments will follow the talks, as well as a light lunch on Friday noon.
Can’t make it in-person? The talks will be available online through Zoom.
In any case, please register (required) here.
For more information, check the following website.
Organization: Dominique Leydet (leydet.dominique@uqam.ca) and Christophe Malaterre (malaterre.christophe@uqam.ca)
This event is organized with the support of the Département de philosophie, the Chaire de recherche du Canada en philosophie des sciences de la vie, the Faculté des Sciences humaines, the Institut des sciences de l’environnement de l’UQAM, the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie, the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire en philosophie politique, and the Centre de recherche en éthique.
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The Montreal Workshop on Emotions and Normativity @ W-3235, UQAM [Hybrid]
10 Oct – 11 Oct All day
The Montreal Workshop on Emotions and Normativity aims to discuss recent work on fundamental questions at the intersections of the philosophy of normativity, (meta-)ethics, and the philosophy of emotion.
Keynote speakers: Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University), Alexandra King (Simon Fraser University), Laura Silva (Université Laval), Christine Tappolet (Université de Montreal)
Additional speakers: Alex Carty (McGill University), Alejandro Macías Flores (Université de Montreal), Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien and Zoey Lavallee (McGill, CRÉ), Melissa Hernández Parra (Université de Montreal), Guillaume Soucy (Université du Québec à Montreal)
Registration required to attend in person via this link.
To attend online, register here.Day 1 – Thursday October 10th
9h15: Opening remarks from Ryoa Chung (coffee/snacks provided)
9h30: Morning keynote – Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University), Title TBD
10h45: Alexander Carty (McGill), “Blame and Blameworthiness are Agent-Relative”
12h00: Lunch break
13h00: Anne-Marie Gagne-Julien and Zoey Lavallee (McGill, CRE), “Affective Injustice in Psychiatry: Emotion Hegemonizing and Psychiatric Drugs”
14h15: Melissa Hernandez Parra (Université de Montréal), “The Relativist Challenge to Moral Attributions: Addressing Variation in Responsibility Practices”
15h30: Coffee Break
15h45: Afternoon keynote: Laura Silva (Université Laval), “Feeling Reasons and Believing Feelings”
18h00: Dinner at Bistro Tendresse (1259 Rue Ste Catherine East)Day 2 – Friday October 11th
10h00: Morning keynote: Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal), Title TBD
11h15: Alejandro Macías Flores (Université de Montréal), “No Way José! A phenomenological analysis of incredulity”
12h30: Lunch Break
14h00: Guillaume Soucy (Université du Québec à Montréal), “Aesthetic constructivism: an attempt at a formal definition of the aesthetic standpoint”
15h15: Coffee break
15h45: Afternoon keynote: Alex King (Simon Fraser University), Title TBD
17h30: 5à7 at Ginkgo, UQAM, 308 Rue Ste Catherine EastFor any inquiries and further information, please contact: Alex Carty (alexander.carty@mail.mcgill.ca)
Organization: Alex Carty (McGill), Melissa Hernandez (UdeM) and Guillaume Soucy (UQÀM), with the support of the Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ), the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN) and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
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Annabelle Lever (Science Po, Paris) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid
12 h 00 – 13 h 30
Annabelle Level (Science Po, Paris) will be presenting her recent work at the CRÉ: “The equal right to Stand as a Candidate and the Democratic Value of Election”. The lecture will be followed by a discussion chaired by Charles Blattberg (UdeM).
To participate via Zoom, click here.
If you plan to participate in the event and would like to receive a copy of the article that will be presented, please write to valery.giroux@umontreal.ca.
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Conference Series “Exclusions et dissidences démocratiques” at Université Laval @ Université Laval
2 Oct 9 h 00 – 4 Oct 16 h 00
Schedule
Wednesday October 2nd:
- 9h00-10h00: Naïma Hamrouni (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières): Domination herméneutique et gaslighting médical en contexte néocolonial
- 10h00-11h00: Juliette Roussin (Université Laval): La mésinformation démocratique comme forme de dissidence
- 11h30-12h30: Florent Guénard (Université Paris-Est Créteil): L’adhésion à l’autoritarisme
- 13h30-14h30: Patrick Turmel (Université Laval): Ce que l’argent fait à la démocratie. Inégalités économiques, exclusion citoyenne et dissidence démocratique
- 14h45-15h45: Charles Girard (Lyon 3): Paroles contre paroles. Les conflits internes à la liberté d’expression
Thursday October 3rd:
- 9h00-10h00: Arash Abizadeh (Université McGill): La passion, l’action et le mythe du concret
- 10h00-11h00: Sylvie Loriaux (Université Laval): L’exclusion comme dépersonnification juridique. Un regard kantien sur la situation des réfugiés
- 11h30-12h30: Martin Deleixhe (Université Lubre de Bruxelles): L’internationalisme ouvrier, une expérience démocratique? Sur l’activisme politique des exilés
- 13h30-14h30: Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp (Université Laval): Acceptabilité sociale, légitimité et exclusion
- 14h45-15h45: Hourya Bentouhami-Molino (Toulouse): Démocratie et chasse à l’étranger
Friday October 4th:
- 9h30-12h15: Doctoral workshop with Thomas Charrayre (Science Po Paris), Pierre-Louis Côté (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières), Yann Robert (Lyon 3) and Sophie Savard-Laroche (Université Laval)
Registration
The event is co-sponsored by the Institut d’éthique appliqué de l’Université Laval (IDÉA), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the faculté de philosophie de l’Université Laval, and the Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ).
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Philosophy of social movements @ Room 3038, Pavillon Marguerite D'Youville
9 h 00 – 16 h 00
Workshop organized by Christian Nadeau for the Department of Philosophy at the University of Montreal and the Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ).
The event will be held in French.
9:00: Yann Allard-Tremblay (McGill): A Critique of Colonial Interpretations of Indigenous Resistance.
10:30: Marie-Pier Lemay (Carleton): Solidarity as a Response: The Global Movement of Resistance Against Gender-Based Violence.
13:00: Candice Delmas (Northeastern): Non-Ideal Theory and Resistance.
With the participation of Dominique Leydet (UQAM), Ryoa Chung (UdeM), and Christian Nadeau (UdeM).
For more information: Christian.nadeau@umontreal.ca
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La désobéissance incivile. Discussion avec la philosophe Candice Delmas @ Le Port de tête bookstore
19 h 00 – 20 h 30
The CRÉ is delighted to invite you to an evening of discussion, in French, on the themes of resistance, activism, and civil and uncivil disobedience, featuring Candice Delmas, philosopher at Northeastern University in Boston, as she presents her book, The Duty to Resist, recently translated in French.
All are welcome!
Event organization, moderation, and inquiries: Christian Nadeau (christian.nadeau@umontreal.ca).
What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? Philosophers often argue that citizens of a generally just state must obey the law, even when it is unjust, except in rare cases of civil disobedience to protest specific issues. Activists, on the other hand—whether fighting for civil rights, combating violence against women, or addressing the climate crisis—often believe that the primary obligation is to resist injustice.
Reexamining the concept of political obligation, Candice Delmas demonstrates that the duty to resist is grounded in the same principles as the duty to obey the law. Forms of uncivil disobedience, from offering clandestine aid to migrants and leaking unauthorized documents to ecosabotage and cyberattacks, can sometimes be justified, and even morally required, in democratic societies.
It is through such illicit and uncivil actions that the Freedom Riders challenged segregation in the United States, that #BlackLivesMatter exposed police violence, and that #MeToo revealed the widespread nature of harassment and femicide. Incivility disrupts, accuses, and makes indifference impossible, forcing people to take a stand.
So, what is legitimate to do in defense of a just cause in a rule-of-law state that turns a blind eye to critical issues?
