Calendar

Oct
9
Wed
2024
Annabelle Lever (Science Po, Paris) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid
Oct 9 @ 12:00 – 13:30
Annabelle Lever (Science Po, Paris) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid

Annabelle Level (Science Po, Paris) will be presenting her recent work at the CRÉ: “The equal right to Stand as a Candidate and the Democratic Value of Election”.  The lecture will be followed by a discussion chaired by Charles Blattberg (UdeM).

To participate via Zoom, click here.

If you plan to participate in the event and would like to receive a copy of the article that will be presented, please write to valery.giroux@umontreal.ca.

Oct
10
Thu
2024
The Montreal Workshop on Emotions and Normativity @ W-3235, UQAM [Hybrid]
Oct 10 – Oct 11 all-day

The Montreal Workshop on Emotions and Normativity aims to discuss recent work on fundamental questions at the intersections of the philosophy of normativity, (meta-)ethics, and the philosophy of emotion.

Keynote speakers: Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University), Alexandra King (Simon Fraser University), Laura Silva (Université Laval), Christine Tappolet (Université de Montreal)

Additional speakers: Alex Carty (McGill University), Alejandro Macías Flores (Université de Montreal), Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien and Zoey Lavallee (McGill, CRÉ), Melissa Hernández Parra (Université de Montreal), Guillaume Soucy (Université du Québec à Montreal)

Registration required to attend in person via this link.
To attend online, register here.

Day 1 – Thursday October 10th
9h15: Opening remarks from Ryoa Chung (coffee/snacks provided)
9h30: Morning keynote – Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University), Title TBD
10h45Alexander Carty (McGill), “Blame and Blameworthiness are Agent-Relative”
12h00: Lunch break
13h00Anne-Marie Gagne-Julien and Zoey Lavallee (McGill, CRE), “Affective Injustice in Psychiatry: Emotion Hegemonizing and Psychiatric Drugs”
14h15Melissa Hernandez Parra (Université de Montréal), “The Relativist Challenge to Moral Attributions: Addressing Variation in Responsibility Practices”
15h30: Coffee Break
15h45: Afternoon keynote: Laura Silva (Université Laval), “Feeling Reasons and Believing Feelings”
18h00: Dinner at Bistro Tendresse (1259 Rue Ste Catherine East)

Day 2 – Friday October 11th
10h00: Morning keynote: Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal), Title TBD
11h15Alejandro Macías Flores (Université de Montréal), “No Way José! A phenomenological analysis of incredulity”
12h30: Lunch Break
14h00Guillaume Soucy (Université du Québec à Montréal), “Aesthetic constructivism: an attempt at a formal definition of the aesthetic standpoint”
15h15: Coffee break
15h45: Afternoon keynote: Alex King (Simon Fraser University), Title TBD
17h30: 5à7 at Ginkgo, UQAM, 308 Rue Ste Catherine East

For any inquiries and further information, please contact: Alex Carty (alexander.carty@mail.mcgill.ca)

Organization: Alex Carty (McGill), Melissa Hernandez (UdeM) and Guillaume Soucy (UQÀM), with the support of the Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ), the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN) and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Hugues-Leblanc Conference 2024: Simon Caney on Climate Justice @ Université du Québec à Montréal
Oct 10 – Oct 11 all-day
Hugues-Leblanc Conference 2024: Simon Caney on Climate Justice @ Université du Québec à Montréal

The Departement of philosophy at UQAM invites you to the 2024 Hugues-Leblanc lectures, October 10th-11th, room W-5215. 

Guest speaker Prof. SIMON CANEY (Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick) will deliver three lectures on the theme: CLIMATE JUSTICE

Schedule:

“What Kind of Climate Duties Do We Have to Future Generations?” 

Thursday, October 10th, 15:30-17:30 (Eastern Standard Time)

Commentator: Éric Pineault (UQAM)

“What is a Just Transition to a Sustainable World?”

Frisday, October 11th, 10h00-12h00 (Eastern Standard Time)

Commentator: Dominique Leydet (UQAM)

“Political Responsibilities to Tackle Climate Change”

Vendredi 11 octobre, 13h30-15h30 (Eastern Standard Time)

Commentator: Matthias Fritsch (Concordia)

All activities will take place in person, room W-5215 (UQAM, Departement of philosophy, 455 Boulevard René-Lévesque Est, Montréal, Québec, Canada). Refreshments will follow the talks, as well as a light lunch on Friday noon. 

Can’t make it in-person? The talks will be available online through Zoom.

In any case, please register (required) here

For more information, check the following website.

Organization: Dominique Leydet (leydet.dominique@uqam.ca) and Christophe Malaterre (malaterre.christophe@uqam.ca)

This event is organized with the support of the Département de philosophie, the Chaire de recherche du Canada en philosophie des sciences de la vie, the Faculté des Sciences humaines, the Institut des sciences de l’environnement de l’UQAM, the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie, the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire en philosophie politique, and the Centre de recherche en éthique.

Oct
11
Fri
2024
Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna College) @ Université du Québec à Montréal
Oct 11 @ 15:00 – 17:00
Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna College) @ Université du Québec à Montréal

Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna College) will give a presentation entitled “Standpoint Epistemology – Social or Applied?” at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

Registration is required. Information about the room and exact location of the presentation will provided after registering via the following link.

The event is co-organized by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ) and the Canada Research Chair on Epistemic Injustice and Agency.

Abstract

As a standpoint epistemologist, I have sometimes been called an “applied epistemologist”. But is this characterization of standpoint epistemology correct? On the surface, one might think the distinction is insignificant. But I argue that the interpretation of standpoint epistemology as an applied epistemology serves an important ideological purpose: it preserves an epistemological landscape wherein mainstream, or traditional epistemology, is the default theory of knowledge. This in turn diminishes some of the central insights of standpoint epistemology, most notably those that represent standpoint epistemology as an alternative to classical theory, or demand a revision of key components of traditional epistemology.

This paper aims to accomplish two tasks: first, to show that standpoint epistemology, though a social epistemology, is not an applied epistemology. I’ll then argue that classical epistemology is social in many of the same ways that standpoint epistemology is – it merely hides this fact. In epistemology, traditional epistemology holds pride of place. It maintains this grip on the field primarily through the devaluation of alternatives, like standpoint theory. By clarifying the relationship between the social and applied, as well as between traditional and standpoint, I hope to de-center traditional epistemology, and to reposition it as but one theory among many.

Nov
27
Wed
2024
Miklós István Zala (Aarhus University) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid
Nov 27 @ 12:00 – 13:30
Miklós István Zala (Aarhus University) @ Room 309, UdeM, hybrid

The CRÉ is pleased to welcome Miklós István Zala (Aarhus University), who will be giving a presentation titled ‘Justice and Social Responsibility for Causing Disability Disadvantage.’ The event will be moderated by Hugo Cossette Lefebvre (Aarhus University). The presentation will last approximately 40 minutes and will be followed by a general discussion.

To participate via Zoom, click here.

Abstract
The social model of disability holds that society makes people with impairments disabled; that is, the social model makes a causal claim. However, some commentators are skeptical about the usefulness of the social model’s causal analysis (see Samaha 2007). Sean Aas and David Wasserman (2016) provide a forceful argument for why such a causal analysis is important: if society causes disability disadvantage, eliminating or mitigating such disadvantage has a higher priority vis-à-vis other disadvantages society did not cause. Their starting point is Nagel’s 1997 paper “Justice and Nature.” Nagel holds that society is not responsible for those disadvantages it did not cause. While Aas and Wasserman acknowledge that Nagel’s essay makes steps in the right direction regarding social responsibility, they rightly reject his radical narrowing of the purview of justice. They especially disagree with Nagel that society bears no responsibility for disadvantages if they are the unintended results of justifiable projects whose mitigation would be costly.
Aas and Wasserman lay down an alternative conception of social responsibility. They provide four criteria for when society is responsible for disadvantage. One of these states that society is responsible for a disadvantage if and only if the given disadvantage results from societal policies, which “in the course of making some better off, foreseeably make others, who have some claim to a justification of those policies, worse off.” Just like Nagel, Aas and Wasserman approach the question of just and unjust disadvantages from a tort law perspective—foreseeability as a responsibility-limiting factor is familiar from the tort law literature on “proximate cause.”  However, this literature makes it clear that using foreseeability as a responsibility-limiting factor can be problematic. Sometimes, agents are not responsible for disadvantages they can foresee and can be held responsible for causing disadvantages they did not foresee. Using the example of inaccessible public infrastructure, I argue that there are instances when the foreseeability criterion should be replaced with strict liability for causing unforeseeable disadvantages. In other instances, social actors are at fault for not foreseeing the caused disadvantages. As I aim to show in the paper, which of these cases applies depends on the available epistemic resources of agents in charge of providing access.
Nov
29
Fri
2024
Jan Kandiyali (Durham University) and Barry Maguire (University of Edinburgh) @ Online
Nov 29 @ 12:00 – 13:00
Jan Kandiyali (Durham University) and Barry Maguire (University of Edinburgh) @ Online

As part of the activities of the Philosophy of Work Network, Jan Kandiyali (Durham University) and Barry Maguire (University of Edinburgh) will offer a presentation entitled: “Socialism and Collective Ownership of the Means of Production”.

The activities of the Philosophy of Work Network are open to researchers and graduate students with research interests in this area. Please write to the organizers, Denise Celentano (denise.celentano@umontreal.ca) and Pablo Gilabert (pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca), to receive the zoom link.

Abstract

Historically, socialism has been identified with collective ownership of the means of production. However, in the face of the failure of central planning, and influential arguments about the necessity of markets and private ownership, many contemporary socialists have sought to sever the link between socialism and collective ownership. The socialists we have in mind define socialism exclusively in terms of a set of values, usually some form of robust equality of opportunity, and then see the question of what form of economic organisation realises those values as entirely separate. In this paper, we reject this decoupling of socialism from collective ownership. Our argument has two steps. In the first, we outline an important but nowadays underappreciated value, namely that of solidarity or mutual care, understood as the positive counterpart to productive alienation, and argue that this, rather than robust equality of opportunity, is the heart of the socialist ideal. The ideal of solidarity is one in which we all care about one another, and care that we care about one another. In the second, we show that solidarity is partly constituted by collective ownership of the means of production.