Événements

Oct
6
mar
2020
Kristin Andrews (York University) @ Pré-inscription requise | Registration required (ely.mermans@umontreal.ca)
Oct 6 @ 12:30 – 14:00
Kristin Andrews (York University) @ Pré-inscription requise | Registration required (ely.mermans@umontreal.ca)

Les membres du GRÉEA se réjouissent d’accueillir virtuellement Kristin Andrews (York University), qui nous offrira une présentation intitulée « Welfare and Animal Culture ».

Abstract

Individuals who live according to social norms are phenomenologically responsive to norm violations, and there is empirical evidence that some nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, orangutans, monkeys, and dolphins, have social norms (Andrews 2020a, 2020b). Cultural species are good candidates for having social norms, and there is empirical evidence that many nonhuman animals are cultural, including mammals, birds, fish, and insects (see Whiten 2017 for a review). These two premises suggest that a wide range of nonhuman animals may be phenomenologically responsive to social practices, and violations of these practices, or the inability to engage in them, may lead to emotional harm and suffering. The bourgeoning research on culture and social norms in animals has implications for welfare considerations. For example, if the rodents and fish used in the lab experience responsiveness to appropriate and inappropriate behavior, then best practices for welfare should include guidelines for housing these animals in a way that respects their social and cultural needs as well as their physiological ones.  Furthermore, welfare with regard to conservation efforts should include preserving not just an animal’s biological material and their environments, but also their cultures. Individuals who have social norms can be harmed in more ways than individuals whose negative and positive affect is limited to tissue damage. The growing recognition that many species are cultural species has ethical consequences that should be integrated into welfare practice.

Andrews, K. 2020a forthcoming. Naïve normativity: The social foundation of moral cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

Andrews, K. 2020b forthcoming. The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, edition 2. Routledge.

Whiten, A. 2017. A second inheritance system: the extension of biology through culture. Interface Focus 7: 20160142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0142.

Oct
7
mer
2020
« A Republic for All Sentients: Social Freedom Without Free Will » @ Pour obtenir le lien zoom, contacter Valéry: valery.giroux@umontreal.ca
Oct 7 @ 12:30 – 14:15
"A Republic for All Sentients: Social Freedom Without Free Will" @ Pour obtenir le lien zoom, contacter Valéry: valery.giroux@umontreal.ca

Dans le cadre des midis de l’éthique du CRÉ, nous sommes heureuses et heureux d’accueillir notre chercheur invité Eze Paez, qui nous offrira une présentation intitulée « A Republic for All Sentients: Social Freedom Without Free Will ».

Résumé

Most nonhuman animals, whether domesticated or wild, live on the terms imposed on them by human beings. This condition of being under the mastery of another, or domination, is what the intellectual tradition of republicanism has identified as political unfreedom. There are several desiderata that a successful republican account must meet if it is to be an intellectually satisfactory and practically workable political philosophy for an interspecies community. It is necessary to show that freedom as nondomination is something from which animals can benefit, and that it can be robustly secured through a system of laws and social norms. In this article I discuss part of the problem of freedom: that is, how social freedom as nondomination can be a good for agents who lack a free will, as animals presumably do. First, sentient animals are intentional systems that make choices in a reliably reason-responsive way and perceive at least some things as inherently attractive or avoidable. If it can be valuable for typical human adults to retain control of their choices and decide on their own terms, then it can be valuable for less cognitively complex intentional agents as well. Furthermore, I argue that it is appropriate to use the language of freedom in order to articulate the problem of how to relate politically with them, since it is the one employed in the struggle for the political enfranchisement of those who have been denied full citizenship.

 

Crédit: Hartmut Kiewert, « Coffee Break », 2016.

Oct
13
mar
2020
« The Cheese that Agriculture Won’t Allow » @ En ligne.
Oct 13 @ 12:00 – 13:30
"The Cheese that Agriculture Won't Allow" @ En ligne.

Les membres du GRÉEA et du CRÉ sont heureux d’accueillir Constantine Sandis, qui nous offrira une présentation intitulée « The Cheese that Agriculture Won’t Allow ».

Résumé

In recent years, the European Union has been amending its agricultural bills to ban the use of terms like ‘cheese’, ‘milk’, ‘butter’, ‘mayonnaise’, ‘sausage’, and even ‘burger’ in the marketing and advertising of plant-based products. Now the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CIFA) and the USDA in the States are following suit. The socio-economic and political motivations behind the proposed legislation are obvious. Without losing sight of them, this paper focuses primarily on the poverty of the linguistic arguments mounted in defence of said regulations. These allege essential ties between certain words and animal produce. Thus, for example, in February 2019 The Globe and Mail reported ‘lawyers say…cheese is a common name defined by its standard of composition; it must be made from milk and/or milk products; and milk comes [from] the normal lacteal secretions obtained from the mammary glands of animals’.

I begin this paper by pointing out that such claims are factually false, as evidenced by the existence of coconut cream, almond milk, and cocoa butter, all of which are exempt from all current and proposed legislation. I next argue that there is no coherent argument against the extension of such terms to products derived from soya, oats, cashews, etc. Following an interlude in which I briefly compare the rhetoric of vegan companies to those of animal agriculture, I conclude with some remarks regarding the relation of meaning to use, and reflect upon why it is much easier to engineer the extension of concepts rather than their contraction.

Nov
3
mar
2020
Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College) @ Pré-inscription requise | Registration required (ely.mermans@umontreal.ca)
Nov 3 @ 12:00 – 14:00
Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College) @ Pré-inscription requise | Registration required (ely.mermans@umontreal.ca)

Dans le cadre de son cycle de visioconférences | Online presentations series 2020-2021, le GRÉEA reçoit Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College), qui offrira une présentation intitulée « Climate Ethics and The Right to be Cold ».

Résumé

This talk explores climate ethics through the lens of the 2015 book, The Right to be Cold. The book traces Sheila Watt-Cloutier’s journey from childhood through adulthood and describes her international advocacy on behalf of Canada’s Inuit communities, as well as Arctic peoples throughout the world. I argue that Watt-Cloutier’s account offers important lessons for climate ethics and climate justice, by highlighting the deeply contextual and relational dimensions of climate impacts; implicitly challenging highly abstract and ideal conceptions of justice; and at the same time, strategically deploying the notion of human rights to convey what is at stake for Arctic peoples in a changing climate.

Nov
18
mer
2020
Michaël Lessard (University of Toronto) @ En ligne.
Nov 18 @ 12:00 – 13:30
Michaël Lessard (University of Toronto) @ En ligne.

Les membres du GRÉEA sont heureux d’accueillir Michaël Lessart (UofT) pour une présentation intitulée « L’animal, toujours dans l’enclos de la propriété? Bilan des cinq premières années suivant la réforme du droit animalier ».

Résumé

Dès lors que l’animal n’est plus une chose selon le droit mais que le droit des biens s’applique à lui, fait-il concrètement un pas hors de l’enclos de la propriété ?

Dans cette présentation, je soutiendrai que la réforme juridique du droit animalier a peu fait pour sortir les animaux de l’enclos de la propriété. Une prémisse de mon analyse est qu’un des principaux marqueurs concrets de la propriété est le droit d’abusus. En effet, l’abusus, cet attribut de la propriété civiliste, donne aux propriétaires la prérogative de disposer de leurs biens à leur guise, que ce soit en les vendant, en les donnant, en les démembrant ou en les détruisant. Sur la base de la jurisprudence des cinq dernières années, je démonterai que, malgré la réforme de 2015, les animaux sont encore soumis au droit d’abusus et, surtout, qu’aucune restriction n’empêche leur propriétaire de les abandonner ni de les « détruire ». Si, par l’adoption de la Loi sur le bien-être et la sécurité de l’animal, l’Assemblée nationale a renforci les protections en matière de bien-être et de sécurité dont bénéficient certains animaux au cours de leur vie, elle n’empêche pas un être humain d’y mettre fin arbitrairement. L’absence de modifications au droit d’abusus nous empêche alors de voir la modification du Code civil comme la première étape d’une extraction des animaux du domaine de la propriété : les animaux peuvent toujours être détruits en toute impunité (dès lors que la technique de mise à mort s’assure une réduction optimale de la souffrance animale). Une fois cette démonstration faite, j’offrirai quelques pistes pour donner un réel sens à cette disposition voulant que « [l]es animaux ne sont pas des biens / [a]nimals are not things ».

Cette présentation a quatre parties. Dans la première partie, je rappelle en quoi l’abusus est un attribut essentiel du droit de propriété. Dans la deuxième partie, je recense la jurisprudence des cinq dernières années et conclus que les tribunaux considèrent encore que l’abusus demeure inchangé depuis la réforme de 2015. Dans la troisième partie, j’examine en détail l’article 898.1 du Code civil du Québec et l’article 6 de la Loi sur le bien-être et la sécurité de l’animal afin d’y souligner les ressources juridiques ouvrant la porte à une interprétation de la réforme de 2015 qui limiterait grandement la possibilité de mettre à mort un animal. Dans la quatrième partie, je soutiens que l’évolution des mentalités au cours des prochaines décennies pourra également affecter l’abusus parce que l’article 7 de la même loi et le Code criminel adoptent des standards juridiques fondés sur l’acceptabilité sociale. Ces deux dernières parties fournissent des arguments aux praticien·nes et activistes désirant user des lois actuelles pour améliorer la situation juridique des animaux.

Accessibilité

Le Centre de recherche en éthique est accessible aux personnes à mobilité réduite.

Le GRÉEA reconnaît que les terres sur lesquelles ses activités ont lieu font parties du territoire traditionnel non cédé des Kanien’keha:ka (Mohawks), qui a longtemps servi de lieu de rassemblement et d’échange entre les nations.

Déc
8
mar
2020
Christopher H. Lean (University of Sydney) @ En ligne.
Déc 8 @ 18:00 – 19:30
Christopher H. Lean (University of Sydney) @ En ligne.

Les membres du GRÉEA se réjouissent d’accueillir virtuellement Christopher H. Lean (University of Sydney), qui nous offrira une présentation intitulée « Against Ecological Neoliberalism ».

Résumé

Philosophers previously have explored the connection between population ecology and economics through the population models they share. There has been, however, a more recent exchange between political and normative strands of economics and conservation ecology, one that focuses not just on population models but the justifications for intervening in nature’s economy. This is the emergence of what I am referring to as ecological neoliberalism through a union of political convenience between those sceptical of invasive species control and the supporters of globalised free-market ideology (including authors from The Economist). Ecological neoliberalism is the position that there should be open biotic borders, and we should not control the free movement of species. When species can move and interact with new ecological systems, they create novel ecosystems. These novel arrangements create experimental markets in nature’s economy, providing opportunities for the efficient production of goods for humans (ecosystem services). When invasives supersede local populations, it indicates previous biotic systems were inefficient, which is why they were replaced, and therefore it is wrong to protect indigenous ‘losers’ from extinction. Those who act to defend indigenous species are accused of being xenophobic against recent biotic migrants. This paper outlines the disconnect between the economic and political arguments as applied to human economies and nature’s economy.

 

Jan
28
jeu
2021
« Hierarchies » @ En ligne.
Jan 28 – Jan 29 Jour entier
"Hierarchies" @ En ligne.
Hierarchies are pervasive. They structure our economic organizations, political institutions, and overall social relations. We find hierarchies at work, in our political systems, in our relation with non-human groups, even within the family. In a less explicit way, hierarchies also tend to shape the very way we interact with each other.

 

The concept of hierarchy also plays a central, if often implicit, role in many works of social and political philosophy. Despite this, the concept itself remains largely under-theorized. This conference will bring together scholars from various areas of social and political philosophy to discuss, among other things, the relevance or inescapability of hierarchies, their grounds, rationale, and structural effects, their justifiability, and the conditions, if any, under which just or non-dominating hierarchies may occur.

 

We aim to include a range of perspectives on the normative significance of hierarchy across social, institutional and political contexts, such as: division of labour and organization of work; systems of meritocracy; hierarchies of race/class/gender/species; stereotyping; political power/authority.

Due to the current uncertainty surrounding travel restrictions, the conference will take place by videoconference, over two half-days. We plan for each panel to have pre-circulated papers.

 

Confirmed speakers:

Teresa Bejan (Oxford University)
Daniel Bell (Tsingua University)
Pablo Gilabert (Concordia University)
Michael Hanchard (University of Pennsylvania)
Lisa Herzog (University of Groeningen)
Niko Kolodny (UC Berkeley)
Meena Krishnamurthy
Wang Pei (Fudan University
Han van Wietmarschen (University College London)
Elena Ziliotti (Delf University of Technology)

Organisation: Juliette Roussin, Hannah Carnegy-Arbuthnott, Pablo Gilabert and Denise Celentano

Fév
19
ven
2021
On the placebo effect @ À déterminer.
Fév 19 @ 10:00 – 11:30
On the placebo effect @ À déterminer.

Présentation de Phoebe Friesen au GRIN/CRÉ. Phoebe nous parlera de ses travaux entourant l’effet placebo.