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Virtue and Moral Reasoning Under Oppressive Social Condition

Quand :
10 février 2018 – 12 février 2018 Jour entier
Où :
Concordia University
Two-Day Workshop on


KEYNOTES BY:   Charlotte Witt (U New Hampshire), Eric Wiland (U Missouri, St. Louis), Elijah Milgram (U Utah), and Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr College).


How should we think about virtue and practical rationality under oppressive conditions? Practical rationality and virtues are often understood in terms of ideals, such as: fully flourishing agents, ideal observers, or reasoners who are not subject to influences of sensibility. It is unclear, however, whether such ideals are helpful for us, non-ideal agents when facing real-life decisions in a non-ideal world.

We shall discuss questions such as: How can ideals of complete virtue or rationality be relevant for non-ideal agents in non-ideal social circumstances? What does it mean for oppressed people to be virtuous and rational? How do social structures make it difficult to become virtuous or rational? Are virtues or rationality relative to social and political contexts? Are some virtues essentially geared towards non-ideal social relations? What role should moral advice, testimony and consciousness-raising play in situations of oppression? How should we reason together about policies when our practical rationality is impaired

KEYNOTES: Charlotte Witt (U New Hampshire), Eric Wiland (U Missouri, St. Louis), Elijah Millgram (U Utah), and Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr College)

For questions, please email one of the organizers: Ulf Hlobil (ulf[dot]hlobil[at]concordia[dot]ca) or Katharina Nieswandt (katharina[dot]nieswandt[at]concordia[dot]ca).
The programme is available (.pdf format).