/home/lecreumo/public html/wp content/uploads/2020/09/capture décran le 2020 09 25 à 20.50.58

« Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe »

Katharina Nieswandt signe un chapitre intitulé « Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe », dans Roger Teichmann (dir.), The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe, à paraître.

Résumé

Following Elizabeth Anscombe, rights exist within practices. A right consists in a bundle of possible and impossible moves within the relevant social ‘game’, e.g. the practice of private property. What becomes of basic rights on such a social-constructivist conception? Metaphysically, basic rights do not differ from other rights. The right not to be murdered, however, enjoys a transcendental status within Anscombe’s moral philosophy, and this construction might extend to other basic rights: Since practical reasoning is directed at the good life, there can be no sound practical inference concluding in murder. Anscombe’s argument for this presupposes a particular conception of human dignity, which is quite similar to the dominant conception in contemporary human rights literature.