Dans le cadre des Ateliers du GRIN, Chrisoula Andreou vient nous présenter une communication intitulée: Parity, Comparability, and Choice.
It is sometimes supposed that, given two potential objects of choice X and Y, and a specific set of circumstances, one of the following must be true: X is better than Y, Y is better than X, or X and Y are equally good. Purported counterexamples have, however, been advanced by many philosophers. The examples I am particularly interested in are those in which it is concluded that the options are “on a par.” I find one sort of example particularly compelling, but I am also sympathetic with those who remain skeptical because not enough has been said about what being “on a par” amounts to. My aim in this paper is to show how some philosophical insights concerning color perception can illuminate cases of parity wherein two options are such that neither is better than the other nor are they equally good.