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Day Agenda
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oct20ven2017
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Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts University) @ À déterminer.10:00 – 12:00Le GRIN est heureux d’accueillir Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, à Tufts University.Informations à venir.
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nov3ven2017
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Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University) @ McGill15:00 – 16:30
Dans le cadre des conférences féministes, le CRÉ est heureux d’accueillir Cheshire Calhoun.
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nov9jeu2017
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La philosophie de l’impôt @ Salle 30912:15 – 13:45
Le CRÉ est heureux d’accueillir Patrick Turmel et David Robichaud, qui nous présenteront leur ouvrage consacré à la philosophie de l’impôt.
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nov17ven2017
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Epistemic Agents: Norms, Control and Responsibility in the Theory of Knowledge @ Université de Montréal (Québec, Canada)nov 17 – nov 18 journée entière
Epistemic Agents: Norms, Control and Responsibility in the Theory of Knowledge
Canadian Society for Epistemology
Annual meeting
http://sce-cse.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/
https://philevents.org/event/show/34282 DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION: Sep. 15
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=cse20171 CONFERENCE DESCRIPTION
It is often assumed that believing, judging, and reasoning do not merely happen to us. In some sense, we seem to be active with respect to such states, events or acts. The idea of epistemic agency is widely discussed in epistemology, debates about metacognition, reasoning, and norms of rationality. At first sight, it implies that at least some of our epistemic states are brought about by some kind of voluntary and norm-governed activities, similar to struggling to retrieve a memory. After all, we seem to be responsible for our beliefs, judgments and inferences. And how can you be responsible for something that we don’t control? On reflection, however, it might also turn out to be misleading. Most notably, beliefs can hardly be deemed “voluntary” or as falling under our intentional control.
Do beliefs, judgments and inferences impose liability of any kind to the epistemic agent? Must we be in charge (in what sense?) of what we believe in order for a belief to be knowledgeable? Does believing, judging or reasoning share something important with bodily actions? Are beliefs governed by ethical norms? Are epistemic norms merely evaluative or do they underwrite deontic statements or offer guidance? These are some of the questions we’d like to discuss at this year’s annual meeting of the Canadian Epistemological Society.KEYNOTE SPEAKER
Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University), title TBASUBMISSION DETAILS
This two days conference invites contributions from epistemologists dealing with any of (but not limited to) the following topics:
– Are epistemic norms reducible to practical norms? Or derivable from epistemic goods like having accurate beliefs or knowledge?
– Is the idea of “mental agency” anything more than a metaphor? In what sense and why is it impossible to believe at will? Are the concepts of self-consciousness or spontaneity helpful in thinking about this?
– What kind of control, if any, do we have on our cognitive states? Do we control our beliefs, e.g., by reasoning or judging?
– Do we have epistemic duties? Can they be explained in terms of epistemic virtues?
– Are there epistemic “wrongdoings”? How should we think about epistemic injustice?
– How can a belief be both epistemically right but morally wrong, and vice versa?
– Are we epistemically liable for our beliefs? How is the idea of believing responsibly related to epistemic agency? Do ideas about epistemic agency have interesting consequences for the internalism/externalism debate?
– What is the status and nature of epistemic norms and norms of rationality? How does coherence and responsiveness to reasons relate to each other?Abstracts (500 words max) should be prepared for double-blind reviewing process. Both documents should be submitted via EasyChair at https://easychair.org/confe
rences/?conf=cse20171 Deadline: September 15 (2017).
Notification of acceptance: October 2 (2017).
If you have any further queries, please contact:
Aude Bandini: aude.bandini[at]umontreal.caMessages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/a
rchives/philos-l.html and at the unofficial mirror sitehttp://blog.gmane.org/ gmane.science.philosophy. region.europe. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.
com/PhilosL/. Discussions should be moved to Chora (a list solely for members of Philos-L): enrol on Chora via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/
archives/chora.html.
To join Philos-L email the single line « subscribe philos-l yourname » to listserv@liv.ac.uk and read the welcome message carefully. To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsubscribe-request@liverpool.ac.uk.
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jan12ven2018
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Nomy Arpaly (Brown) @ UQAM15:00 – 17:00
Le GRIN est heureux d’accueillir Nomy Arpaly (Brown).
Titre de la présentation à venir.
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jan26ven2018
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Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas) @ À déterminer.10:00 – 12:00
Atelier du GRIN. Informations à venir.
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fév1jeu2018
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Susan R. Wolf (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) @ Salle 30912:15 – 13:45
Le CRÉ est heureux d’accueillir Susan Wolf.
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fév9ven2018
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Ralph Wedgwood (University of Southern California)10:00 – 12:00
Le GRIN est heureux d’accueillir Ralph Wedgwood.
Titre à venir.
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mar16ven2018
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Happiness and Affective States @ À déterminer.mar 16 journée entière
Le GRIN et le CRÉ tiendront un atelier intitulé Happiness and Affective States.
Organisation: Mauro Rossi, Sarah Stroud et Christine Tappolet
Conférenciers :
Dan Haybron (Saint Louis University)
Antti Kauppinen (University of Tampere)
Lorraine Besser (Middlebury College)Source de l’image.
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mai3jeu2018
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6ème journées de méta-éthique9:15 – 10:15
Plus d’informations à venir.
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