Jacob T. Levy donnera une conférence le 21 octobre 2021 à 10h00, en ligne.
Constitutional democracy, in both its presidential and parliamentary form, developed as an attempt to simulate some of the benefits of the pluralist and mixed constitution in pre-revolutionary Europe, particularly as re-imagined by Montesquieu under the label of the separation of powers. The challenge was how to balance power against power without relying on distinct estates and social orders. The solution was thought to be institutional design, rules that would allow a unified people to use the practices and forms that had been premised on social division. In some important ways the experiment failed right away, institutional design was both subordinated to and replaced by party competition in ideologically divided electorates. That hybrid form had unexpected advantages and stability – but today it is also proving to be vulnerable to a combination of the executive power Montesquieu warned about and the demagogic authoritarian partisanship the founders of constitutional democracy feared.
Pour s’inscrire, écrire à email@example.com