Les membres du CRÉ se réjouissent de recevoir Mark T. Nelson, qui offrira une présentation intitulée « Moral Psychology and Non-cognitivism: Hume against the Humeans”.

Abstract:  

Humeanism is influential in contemporary metaethics, so it may come as a surprise that a currently popular Humean argument in metaethics should be unacceptable to Hume himself.  The argument in question is the argument from motivational Humeanism to the conclusion of moral non-cognitivism.  I argue that this argument would be unacceptable to Hume because it requires as a further premise the thesis of motivational internalism.  This thesis asserts a universal, necessary connection between an agent’s judging something to be the case morally and that agent’s being motivated to act accordingly, but this runs afoul of a key methodological plank in Hume’s larger project.