/home/lecreumo/public html/wp content/uploads/2021/09/capture décran le 2021 09 14 à 14.19.15

Reasons to trust

Quand :
28 septembre 2021 @ 12:00 – 13:15
Où :
Agora, près du HEC, si la météo le permet

Miriam McCormick nous offrira une présentation intitulée « Reasons to Trust » dans le cadre des midis de l’éthique du CRÉ.


Some reasons to trust are evidential; if I know someone well and come to see that he can be counted on, keep his word, etc., these are evidential reasons to trust him. But trust does not only come about from a careful weighing of the evidence; at least some of the reasons for trusting are non-evidential, or broadly practical. I trust you because you are my friend or because our relationship requires that I do, or because I love you. If I  trust you do something then I believe you will do that thing. Yet, most epistemologists  deny that practical reasons can be genuine reasons for belief.  Faced with these phenomena, three routes are open: (i) Accept that trust based on practical reasons can be rational and so conclude trusting is not believing, (ii) Accept that trusting is believing and so deny that trust based on practical reasons is rational, (iii) Accept that trust based on practical reasons  can be rational, that trusting is believing, and so conclude that believing for practical reasons can sometimes be rational.  One finds endorsement of the first two options, but very little for the third, which is the option I defend. Thinking about the rationality of trust can help us better understand the nature of belief. I argue that trust in best thought of as an emotion, where emotions are understood as including cognitive and non-cognitive elements. If trusting someone is believing them then this provides some motivation for thinking of beliefs in general as kinds of emotions.