Stoljar

Natalie Stoljar

Chair, Department of Philosophy at McGill University.

Postes occupés

2013-2014 Chercheur-e associé-e,
2014-2015 à aujourd'hui Membre régulier-ère,

Biographie

Natalie Stoljar came to McGill in 2006 after holding positions at the Australian National University, Monash University (Melbourne) and the University of Melbourne. Her research is in three areas: feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy (especially moral psychology), and the philosophy of law. In feminist philosophy, she has written on feminist metaphysics, especially the notions of essentialism, realism and nominalism. In social and political philosophy, her work focuses on autonomy and other aspects of moral psychology. She is co-editor (with Catriona Mackenzie) of the 2000 collection Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (OUP). Her current research is funded by a SSHRC Standard Research Grant “Autonomy and Oppression. A Relational Analysis’ (2010-13). In the philosophy of law, she has published on the notions of legal interpretation, constitutional interpretation and judicial review, and the methodology of law.

Recent publications

  • Stoljar, N. ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation.’ In M. Piper and A. Veltman (eds) Autonomy, Oppression and Gender (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 227-254
  • Stoljar, N. ‘ » »Living Constantly at Tiptoe Stance: » » Social Scripts, Psychological Freedom and Autonomy.’ In M. Oshana (ed), Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression (Routledge 2015), pp. 105-123
  • ‘In Praise of Wishful Thinking.  A Critique of Descriptive-Explanatory Theories of Law’ Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, (Forthcoming).
  • ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation.’ In M. Piper and A. Veltman (eds) New Essays on Autonomy and Feminism (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).
  • ‘Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy.’ In Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (In Press, 11,500 words)
  • ‘What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law.’ In W. Waluchow and S. Sciaraffa (eds), The Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, In Press, 9,200 words).
  • ‘Langton on Autonomy and Objectification.’ Jurisprudence (2012) 2: 409-415.
  • ‘Autonomy, Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy’ The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2011) 36: 275-384.
  • ‘Autonomy or Authenticity? Commentary on Andrea Westlund’s “Rethinking Relational Autonomy” and Catriona Mackenzie and Jacqui Poltera’s “Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves and Autonomy”’ Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy (2011) 7, number 1: http://web.mit.edu/sgrp.
  • ‘Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.’ In C. Witt (ed.) Feminist Metaphysics. Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self (Springer Verlag, 2011).
  •  ‘Waluchow on Moral Opinions and Moral Commitments.’ Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (2009) 3: 101-132.
  • ‘Theories of Autonomy.’ In R. E Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper and J. McMillan (eds). Principles of Health Care Ethics (2nd Edition) (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2007).  

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