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Charles Côté-Bouchard

Positions held

2018-2019 to 2021-2022 Postdoctoral researcher(s),

Participation in CRÉ events

28 April 2026 Charles Côté-Bouchard (Collège Montmorency)

Biography

From 2018 to 2020, I have been a postdoctoral fellow at the GRIN (Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité) and the CRÉ (Centre de recherche en éthique), under the cosupervision of Aude Bandini (UdeM) and Ulf Hlobil (Concordia). From 2016 to 2018, I was a part-time lecturer and FRQSC postdoctoral fellow at Rutgers under the supervision of Ernest Sosa. I completed my PhD in philosophy at King’s College London (KCL) in 2017 under the supervision of Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Alvarez. I completed my MA in philosophy at Université de Montréal in 2012 under the supervision of Daniel Laurier.

My areas of specialization are epistemology, ethics, and the connections between these domains. My work is mainly about normativity and norms in epistemology. In my PhD dissertation, I use the resources of metaethics and value theory to elucidate the nature of epistemic normativity. I defend the idea that epistemology is not robustly or categorically normative like ethics. Although they imply norms or values, epistemic facts do not have necessary or intrinsic normative authority. There is not necessarily a normative reason to conform to epistemic norms, i.e. to believe the truth, avoid error, follow the evidence, and the like. My goal during my fellowship at the GRIN is to continue exploring this thesis and its consequences for epistemology and ethics.

In addition to epistemic normativity, my publications and works in progress are about the ethics of belief, doxastic responsibility, epistemic justification, applied epistemology, naturalized epistemology, metaethics, and the nature of normativity. I am also interested in philosophy of action, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and philosophy of science.

Publications

À paraître. ‘Knowledge, reasons, and errors about error-theory’, avec Clayton Littlejohn Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Ed. Robin McKenna & Christos Kyriacou, Palgrave-Macmillan

2019.  ‘‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.’ Synthese 196(4): 1641-1656

  1. ‘Is epistemic normativity value-based?’ Dialogue 56 (3): 407-430
  1. ‘Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco.’ Manuscrito 40 (4): 97-111
  1. ‘Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?’ Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3181-3198.
  1. ‘Epistemic instrumentalism and the too few reasons objection.’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3): 337-355.

Site Web

charles.cote79@gmail.com