Edited by Sarah Stroud, Department of Philosophy, McGill University, and Christine Tappolet, Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal.

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally.

Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.

Readership: Scholars and students of philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind and ethics.

Contents

Introduction, Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet
1. Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion , Michael Smith
2. How is Strength of Will Possible? , Richard Holton
3. Akrasia, Collective and Individual , Philip Pettit
4. Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action , Christine Tappolet
5. Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement , Sarah Stroud
6. Accidie , Evaluation, and Motivation , Sergio Tenenbaum
7. The Work of the Will , Gary Watson
8. Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly , Ralph Wedgwood
9. Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons , Duncan MacIntosh
10. Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory , Joseph Heath
11. Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality , Ronald de Sousa

‘… an attractive volume … Combining all the references together at the end proved to be very helpful as did the fine index … this volume represents an important contribution to action theory, philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and should be read by anyone who works in these areas.’ – Journal of Moral Philosophy

‘…a valuable resource for anyone interested in the nature of rational action.’ – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews