Dans le cadre des ateliers du GRIN, Michael Milona (Ryerson University) offrira une présentation intitulée « Reasons for Perceptualism about Emotion ».
Perceptualism is the thesis that emotions are perceptual experiences of value. This paper explains how perceptualists should address one of the view’s most important and longstanding difficulties, which I call the normative assessability challenge. According to this challenge, perceptualism fails since while emotions are subject to assessment in terms of reasons and rationality, perceptual experiences are not. My solution comes in two parts. I first distinguish different types of normative assessment and argue that we lack strong grounds for holding that emotions are assessable in a way that paradigm sensory perceptual experiences are not. I next offer an argument for why it is a mistake, even independent of any commitment to perceptualism, to maintain that emotions are normatively assessable in a different way than sensory experiences. It turns out emotions are assessable only in a rather uninteresting way that even non-mental states can be.
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