Atelier du GRIN.

« Virtue Epistemology: Metaphysical Implications

Résumé:

A key claim of virtue epistemology (Greco 2012; Sosa 2009, 2011, 2015) is that the normativity characterizing knowledge is the one characterizing performances in general. To put it briefly, knowledge is valuable in the way performances are valuable. As Chrisman (2012, 2016) emphasizes, this is problematic since we have linguistic reasons to take knowledge to be a state and states are to be distinguished from performances (Kenny 1963). The purpose of this presentation is to resist Chrisman’s line of thought. Mainly, I will, first, show that there exists, in the cognitive realm of beliefs and knowledge, what Steward (2012, 2015) names “individual processes”. Second, nothing precludes these cognitive individual processes from displaying the kind of normativity that characterizes performances in general.