

## values

these rather universal factors, the valence of a stimulus for an observer is influenced by the degree to which the stimulus is conducive to the current motivational hierarchy of the individual (see MOTIVE CONSISTENCY; GOALS).

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Colombetti, G. (2005). Appraising valence. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 12(8–10), 103–27.

**values** Values, like \*norms, are often considered to be importantly different from bare facts. In any case, values, whether moral or nonmoral, seem to be related, be it directly or indirectly, to *oughts*. It is useful to distinguish between judgements about what a person values, as expressed by 'S values x', and value judgements (or appraisals) proper, of which the paradigmatic expression can be considered to be 'x is valuable'. Sometimes, the term 'value' also refers to whatever is taken to be valuable, such as when we say that knowledge or peace are important values. It is generally believed that there is a great variety of value predicates. In addition to 'value', there is for instance 'good', 'admirable', 'kind', 'generous', but also 'bad', 'disgusting', 'cruel', or 'mean'.

Most would agree that values and emotions are closely related. This appears particularly obvious when one thinks of value concepts that are lexically derived from emotion terms, such as *admirable*, *disgusting*, *regrettable*, or *shameful*. There are deep disagreements, however, as to what the relation between values and emotions is. This is the debate between *value realism* and *value antirealism*. The basic question is analogous to the one Euthyphro put to Socrates in Plato's dialogues: do we love what is good because it is good, or is something good because we love it (de Sousa 1987). Strong value realism claims that our responses to values are sensitive to a completely independent evaluative reality. A realist who considers that this reality is reducible to what physics posits embraces *naturalism*, whereas a realist who denies this is a *nonnaturalist*. By contrast, value antirealism maintains that our responses constitute values, values being constructions or even projections of our reactions onto a neutral world. One extreme subjectivist view holds that something has value just in case it causes a positive reaction in whoever claims that the thing has value. One problem, obviously, is that things would keep acquiring and losing values, depending on the mood we are in. Another problem is that this view does not leave room for real disagreement about the value of things. This is why subjectivists usually claim that the person whose responses are relevant satisfy a number of conditions, such as normality, complete information, or lack of biases. This is the essence of so-called *ideal observer* theories. In general, most theories try to accommodate the subjective and objective aspects of values.

The debate about the status of values is related to a number of different questions. One important set of questions concerns the meaning of evaluative sentences. One famous but controversial view, dubbed the 'boo-hurray theory', claims that 'x has value' simply expresses our emotions and is thus not truth-assessable in any standard way (Gibbard 1990, Blackburn 1998). Value epistemology tries to determine how value judgements could be justified and what knowledge of values would consist in. One view, which has recently attracted quite a number of followers, claims that our emotions play a crucial role in our epistemic access to values: emotions would be *perceptions* of values (Tappolet 2001, Prinz 2004). Consider fear. Fear, like colour perception, has correctness conditions. Fear is correct (or appropriate) insofar as what one fears is really dangerous (or frightening). As philosophers would put it, danger (or the property of being frightening) is the *formal object* of fear. Thus, one could say that when we feel fear, we perceive the danger of a situation. Though controversial, this account meshes well with an evolutionary story: if we have the disposition to fear wild animals, it is because we are descendants of ancestors whose fears of wild animals helped them to survive.

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**vigilance** The English term 'vigilance' originates from the Latin term '*vigilantia*' meaning to 'keep awake'. For the purposes of psychology, the term can be defined as a heightened state of alertness in response to a stimulus that predicts or could predict some biologically relevant outcome. The purpose of such a state could be to protect oneself from danger, to increase the likelihood of discovering a reward, and/or to clarify some changing environmental circumstance. While the entire brain ultimately participates in these activities in the service of survival, the \*amygdala, a brain region located within the medial temporal lobe, is critically involved in the instantiation of a heightened level of vigilance upon the detection of a stimulus that has proven to have at least some value in predicting biologically relevant outcomes (see RELEVANCE DETECTION). The fact that the amygdala has been shown to be sensitive to stimuli that predict both positive and negative outcomes makes it particularly well suited for this role.

The efferent and afferent connectivity of the amygdala underscores its fundamental role in modulating vigilance states. First, the amygdala directly projects to brainstem autonomic and somatomotor control regions, and can thus set the level of peripheral autonomic and motor tone. In addition, the amygdala can influence the detection of environmental stimuli through its direct reciprocal connections with primary and association sensory cortices (see ATTENTION AND EMOTION). The