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THE SENSE AND REFERENCE OF EVALUATIVE TERMS

What account of evaluative expressions, such as 'is beautiful', 'is generous' or 'is good', should a Fregean adopt? Given Frege's claim that predicates can have both a sense and a reference in addition to their extension, an interesting range of only partially explored theoretical possibilities opens to Frege and his followers.[1] My intention here is to briefly present these putative possibilities and explore one of them, namely David Wiggins' claim that evaluative predicates refer to non-natural concepts and have a sense which is sentiment-involving. In order to defend this claim against objections which aim at showing that evaluative concepts do not really exist, I shall suggest that our awareness of evaluative concepts involves affective (or emotive) states. I shall start with a brief account of Frege's view of predicates.

I

It is beyond doubt that Frege thought that the distinction between sense and reference applies also to the case of predicates: an expression such as 'is a horse' has both a sense and a reference. According to Frege, the reference of a predicate is not constituted by the objects it is true of - that is, by its extension - but by what he calls a *concept*.[2] Thus, in addition to its sense, the predicate 'is a horse' has a reference - the concept *horse* - and an extension - the things which fall under the concept *horse*.

At least one point concerning the distinction between sense and reference at the level of predicates would need clarification. The question is whether Frege was right to claim that a concept under which an object falls is the same as its property.[3] For reasons of space, I shall sidestep this question, as well as the related question of the unsaturatedness of predicates. Thus, I shall leave open both the question whether genuine predicates are of the form 'is an F' or of the form 'F' and the related question whether concepts are properties or not.[4] It is worth noting that the main claims I shall make are independent of these questions.

Given Frege's claim that the sense of a singular term corresponds to the mode of presentation of its reference, the mode of presentation being contained ('enthalten' in the original text) in the sense, it is natural to take the sense of a predicate as corresponding to the mode of presentation of a concept.[5] A consequence of this claim is that just as singular terms can be co-referential, two or more predicates can refer to the same concept in different ways, provided that they have different senses. As Wiggins noted, the predicate 'is a horse' refers to the same concept as 'is an Equus caballus', but

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they present their reference in different ways, making appeal to different conceptions of the concept: if we were to explain the difference between the two predicates, we should have to refer to the different bodies of information upon which the predicates draw, the former being the commonsensical conception of horses, the latter corresponding to their biological conception.[6]

It has to be noted that it is plausible that just as Frege claimed that proper names have what he called a tone (or a colouring), he would have attributed a tone to predicates as well. The tone of a singular term is a subjective element such as a mental image associated with the term. Its subjectivity lies in the fact that it varies from individual to individual, and even for the same individual it can be different at different times.[7] I see no reason why one should deny that predicates have tones. Thus, one could suggest that the evaluative element of evaluative predicates lies in the tone or tones we associate with evaluative predicates. More precisely, one could claim that the tone of evaluative predicates consists in some associated affective state.[8] But what about the subjectivity of tone? Contrary to what a Fregean adopting this line would have to say, it does not seem correct to claim that *any* term can be associated with *any* affective state. There might be ways of dealing with this worry. However, I shall not pursue this question here and shall prescind from tone in the following, concentrating instead on sense, reference and extension.

<center>II</center>

Where does this leave us as to the semantics of evaluative terms? Given that within the Fregean framework it is not possible for a term to have an extension without having a reference or a reference without having a sense, it appears that if we adopt such a framework, we have the following possibilities:

1) Evaluative terms have a sense, a reference, and an extension.
2) Evaluative terms have a sense and a reference, but no extension.
3) Evaluative terms have a sense, but no reference and no extension.
4) Evaluative terms have no sense, no reference, and no extension.

The interesting fact about these four possibilities[9] is that if they are genuine, they would show that the common distinction between realism and irrealism about values - or evaluative concepts, in Frege's terminology - is too simple. Realism about values is usually thought to be the claim that there are genuine

evaluative properties - that values are real in the sense that they are part of the world and cannot be reduced to non-evaluative properties. So, if we suppose that Fregean concepts are properties, realism about evaluative concepts would be the view that evaluative concepts are real.[10] As irrealism about evaluative concepts is just the negation of realism, it follows that irrealism about values amounts to the claim that evaluative concepts are not real. On the first two possibilities, it would seem that provided evaluative statements are construed non-reductively, there are real evaluative concepts. In other terms, evaluative concepts could be both real and empty. If the second possibility counts as a form of realism, it follows that it is wrong to think, as many do, that realism about values entails that at least some of the propositions expressed by evaluative sentences are true.[11] For on this possibility, evaluative terms could have a proper reference, even though no evaluative sentences were true, given that nothing would fall under evaluative concepts.[12] However, this is less than clear: a realist might want to require that evaluative terms have an extension.[13] If so, the second option would not count as a form of realism; only the first would.

If one opts for one of the two last possibilities, it is natural to deny that there are real evaluative concepts. For if one were to maintain that there were any, one would be committed to the claim that we cannot talk about them, given that the terms best suited to do the job would not refer to them. It has to be noted that if the third possibility is a genuine one, it would be wrong to claim that an irrealist is bound to deny that evaluative sentences have a sense.[14] In other words, it appears that it is too simple to oppose (as would someone who has an undifferentiated notion of meaning) realism plus the view that evaluative sentences have a meaning on the one hand and irrealism plus the view that evaluative sentences have no meaning on the other hand.[15]

Instead of fleshing out all the four putative possibilities and discussing their vices and virtues, I shall focus on one particular suggestion.

III

The suggestion I have in mind has been put forward by David Wiggins. According to Wiggins, evaluative predicates have both a sense and a reference. If we take him, as seems likely, to be committed to the claim that evaluative terms have an extension, Wiggins' account corresponds to the first possibility. Wiggins' conception of evaluative predicates can be summarized by the following two claims: a) the sense of evaluative predicates is 'sentiment-involving'[16] and b) the reference of evaluative predicates is a non-

natural concept, that is, a concept which is not one which pulls or will pull its weight in the natural sciences or that can be reduced to concepts which do.[17]

Concerning the former claim, Wiggins writes:

> Roughly speaking, value terms have their sense by being annexed to that which *in the object* calls for certain shareable responses of feeling and action, the responses that it makes appropriate.[18]

In other words, evaluative predicates have the sense they have because the concepts they refer to are concepts which include in their extensions things that, in virtue of being the way they are, make certain affective states appropriate. The sense of 'is beautiful', for instance, is determined by the fact that the things which fall under the concept *beautiful* are such as to make an affective state like admiration or attachment appropriate.

A natural way to understand the notion of sentiment-involvement is to see it manifested in the fact that to elucidate evaluative terms, we have to refer to affective states.[19] On this view, a consequence of the sentiment-involvement of the predicate 'is beautiful', for instance, would be that the sentence 'x is beautiful' is best elucidated in terms of some affective state made appropriate by x, such as admiration or attachment.[20] Indeed, on a minimal account of the notion of sense, one could even say that the sentiment-involvement in question just consists in the fact that evaluative terms have to be elucidated along these lines. (I shall leave open the exegetical question whether or not this is what David Wiggins had in mind.)

As many have noted, there are two importantly different ways to elucidate evaluative predicates. One can elucidate them with respect to our actual appropriate affective responses or in terms of any possible affective response. In possible-worlds jargon, the first option can be formulated as follows: something has a certain value at a world if and only if *in the actual world* it makes appropriate a certain affective state. This option has been dubbed the 'rigid reading' of the biconditional because it keeps the affective responses the same at all possible worlds. By contrast, the second option is called the 'non-rigid' reading. Here is how it would go: something has a certain value at a world if and only if *at that world* it makes appropriate a certain affective state.[21] On the first option, an inhabitant of a possible world who had different affective responses from ours could be wrong about evaluative judgements (and this even if the external conditions in which he had his affective response were suitable). Thereby the scope of errors about evaluative question is extended. This is why many realists favour this option.

What is particularly appealing about the suggestion under consideration is that it is in a position to fulfill two *desiderata* which are not easily reconciled: it can make sense of the relation between evaluative statements and affective and/or motivational states while it is perfectly able to fit the grammar of evaluative terms. Emotivism, for instance - the view that evaluative statements are essentially expressions of affective states - easily fits the first desideratum but flounders on the second one.[22] And, as has been noted by many, unguarded versions of realism have problems making room for the first one.[23]

As is generally recognised, evaluative statements have a privileged link to affective and/or motivational states: evaluative statements more often than not arise out of such states; and they more often than not arouse affective responses. Furthermore, evaluative statements are related to action in the sense that the judgements or beliefs on which they are based are at least generally motivating.[24] These are facts which a semantic account of evaluative terms needs at least to be compatible with.

Now, if the sense of evaluative predicates is sentiment-involving, we can see why evaluative statements often arise out of affective states and also arouse such states. If I approve of some action, for instance, and also think that my approval is appropriate, I will be inclined to say that the action is good, given that something is good just in case it makes approval appropriate and that I, knowing the sense of the terms I use, know that. And a likely effect of my utterance consists in the fact that my audience reacts to what I say. For having its attention drawn to the evaluated action, the audience is likely to manifest its attitude with respect to the action, either displaying the same attitude as mine towards the action or expressing a different attitude towards it.

It has to be noted that on the account of sentiment-involvement under consideration, it does not follow that each time we utter an evaluative term, we need to be in the corresponding affective state. If this were the case, the account under consideration would be in trouble, for at least on some occasions we use evaluative terms without being in any particular affective state. But the fact that the sense of evaluative predicates is sentiment-involving - that on the minimal interpretation suggested above evaluative predicates have to be elucidated in terms of certain affective states - does not have as a consequence that each time we utter a sentence including an evaluative predicate, we need to have any sentiment, even though we often do.

Similarly, the relation between the serious utterance of evaluative sentences and motivation is also readily explained, given the affinity between affective states and motivation. There are two main ways to see the relation between affective states and motivation: either we suppose that affective states can be motivating as such - to fear a dog is, *inter alia*, to be motivated to run away, for instance - or affective states have necessary connections with motivational states, such as desires. However that may be, there is little question as to the fact that affective states are, directly or indirectly, motivating. But then, someone who believes that something is good will also believe that it makes approval appropriate, given his understanding of evaluative language, that is, given his knowledge that what is good makes approval appropriate. And to believe that something makes approval appropriate is to believe that it makes appropriate a state which motivates to act in certain ways. But this amounts to believing that it is appropriate to be motivated to act in certain ways. And someone who believes such a thing is himself likely to be motivated to act in certain ways. Indeed, he will act accordingly, unless he is weak-willed. So much for the first desideratum.

As I said above, the attractive fact about the suggestion under consideration is that it meets the first desideratum while perfectly fitting in with the grammar of evaluative terms, that is, meeting the second desideratum. As many have stressed, evaluative terms linguistically behave in much the same way as non-evaluative terms do, so that it would be odd to say that the former merely express affective states, whereas the latter are genuinely assertoric. Take 'odious' and compare it with an uncontroversially non-evaluative term, such as 'square' (in its literal use). On the face of it, 'odious' appears to be a *bona fide* predicate. Just as 'square', 'odious' can be used to construct well-formed sentences such as 'This is odious'. Such sentences appear to express propositions which allow for appraisal in terms of truth and falsehood. They can figure in that-clauses used to ascribe propositional attitudes such as belief or knowledge. And they can appear in the scope of the full range of logical operators, such as when they are negated or when they figure in the antecedent of conditionals.[25]

This is, of course, just what is to be expected on the account under consideration: apart from the difference at the level of sense and from the fact that the concepts to which they refer are non-natural, evaluative predicates are taken to be much the same as non-evaluative predicates.

IV

Concerning more specifically the second part of the suggestion under consideration, it has to be asked whether or not evaluative concepts are real and whether or not they really are non-natural. As we have seen, two predicates could have the same reference but differ as to their senses. So, it is possible that an evaluative predicate refers to the concept referred to by a non-evaluative predicate. However, it is more plausible that they should be non-natural. The reason is primarily the difficulty of finding adequate identifications of evaluative concepts with natural concepts. What would be the physical feature or set of features common to all beautiful things that would make them fall under some natural concept? And what would be common to all good things apart from being good? We have, as yet, no answer to such questions, and there seems to be little hope of finding any.

But do non-natural concepts really exist? Here is how an argument in favour of an affirmative answer to this question might go. A distinctive feature of the Fregean framework as formulated above is that truth and reference go hand in hand: the singular term and the predicate of a truth-assessable sentence necessarily have a reference. This is a consequence of the two Fregean claims according to which sentences refer to truth-values and the reference of a sentence is determined by the reference of its parts.[26] Thus, the fact that one can construct truth-assessable sentences with an evaluative predicate would be sufficient to show that the evaluative predicate has a reference.

The same conclusion can be arrived at in a different way. Suppose the sentence 'x is F' has a truth-value. Then, from 'x is F', it can be inferred either that there is something which x is or that there is something which x is not, depending on whether 'x is F' is true or false. So in both cases, we quantify over F. Thus here, too, to prove that there are evaluative concepts, one would have to show only that evaluative sentences have truth-values, provided that such sentences cannot be construed reductively. But as we have seen above, the propositions expressed by evaluative sentences appear to admit of assessment in terms of truth. And the difficulties of finding satisfactory indentifications between evaluative and non-evaluative concepts suggest that the prospects of uncovering reductions are meager. One has to conclude, it appears, that there are real evaluative concepts.[27]

This will seem too easy to many.[28] That at least many evaluative sentences have truth-values is uncontroversial. But that it follows from this that the concept to which the predicates refer exists is far from clear, and this is so even if the sentence cannot be construed non-reductively. It might well be necessary for a term to have a real reference that it can figure in sentences

which are truth-assessable, but this is surely not sufficient - or so it will be claimed. With Crispin Wright, we might want to distinguish between a thick and a thin notion of truth, that is, roughly, between truth which is based on independent truth-conferring states of affairs - correspondence truth - and truth which is not, that is, merely disquotational truth.[29]

Can one make room for such a distinction within Frege's framework? It might be suggested that expanding Wright's distinction between thick and thin truth, we distinguish between two kinds of reference which we might call thick and thin reference; predicates which can only be used in sentences which have thin truth-values would have a thin reference, whereas a predicate which can figure in sentence admitting thick truth would have a thick reference. In Philip Pettit's terminology, we might say that whatever is referred to in discourse is *posited*.[30] However, not all the things which are posited are necessarily part of reality. So, the question is whether evaluative statements call for thin or thick truth and, correspondingly, whether the reference of evaluative predicates is thin or thick.

What is needed for thick truth? Following Wright, we can make two requirements.[31] The first is that for being thick, truth needs to command assent by any individual who is fully endowed with cognitive powers. A consequence of this claim is that disagreement about a statement that admits of thick truth has to be explained either in terms of a difference of information concerning the facts or in terms of a difference in the assessment of the facts. The second requirement is that for being thickly true, a statement needs to be about something to which we have access; in particular, for evaluative statements to admit of thick truth, there has to be a satisfactory account of how it is possible for us to be aware of evaluative concepts. We shall see that the first requirement can only be satisfied if the second is, so that the issue turns on whether or not there is an epistemology of values. Let me start with the first requirement.

The crucial question is whether disagreement about an evaluative issue can be rationally irresoluble in the sense that it persists even if the two disagreeing parties have access to the same facts and assess them similarly. Given the widespread character of disagreement about questions of values, it might seem easy to conceive a case of a dispute which is not due to a misapprehension of facts. But as Wright notes, all depends on what one counts as a fact.[32] It will always be open to a realist to claim that disagreement is based on a misapprehension of evaluative facts, for to exclude such facts from the outset is question-begging. So, the realist might claim that if disagreement persists, it must be because at least one of the two

disputants misapprehend the evaluative fact, being, so to speak, evaluatively *blind*.

Well, what is it to be blind as to evaluative matters? This leads us to the second requirement: a realist who claims that persistent disagreement about values is due to a misapprehension of evaluative facts owes us an account of how we can come to be aware of evaluative facts and of how we could fail to recognise such facts.

V

The natural answer for a realist who has gone so far is to claim that in analogy with colours and colour perception, we are aware of evaluative facts in virtue of our affective states. The idea is that just as colour sensations normally allow us to be aware of colours, certain affective states - that is, sentiments (or emotions) - normally allow us to be aware of the fact that something has a value; they normally present us with evaluative facts or, to put it differently, they represent evaluative facts.[33] The qualification 'normally' is needed to take into account cases where affective states misfire, failing to presents things as they are. The affective states which are plausible candidates for such a presentational or representational function are intentional, occurrent states which are essentially felt. Examples of such states are instances of (conscious) fear, anger, love, hate, delight or amusement. Thus, the suggestion would be that my states of fear normally present me with the fact that what I am afraid of is dangerous.

An important point in favour of such a suggestion is that it appears to correspond to the phenomenology of values. As McDowell notes with respect to our awareness of aesthetic values, 'Aesthetic experience typically presents itself, at least in part, as a confrontation with values: an awareness of values as something residing in an object and available to be encountered.'[34] Much the same, I think, is true of moral experience.

A second point which speaks for the claim that we are aware of evaluative facts in virtue of our affective states is underlined by the fact that many of us - philosophers and laymen - have been, and are still, inclined to say that there is something like moral or aesthetic vision and blindness, that is, that we might see or fail to see values.[35] If sentiments present us with evaluative facts, it is legitimate to say that in a sense, we feel values. And from this, it is only a short step to saying that we see values.

A third point in favour of the suggestion that our sentiments normally present us with values is that we assess sentiments with respect to their

appropriateness and inappropriateness. Thus, we think that it is appropriate to fear danger, for instance, while it would be inappropriate to fear innocuous things. In addition to being appropriate with respect to the value they present, sentiments can also be appropriate with respect to the degree of the value. Just as values admit of degrees, sentiments have degrees. Thus, an intense fear is appropriate with respect to an important danger, while it would be inappropriate with respect to an insignificant danger. But what makes fear appropriate or inappropriate? The simplest answer, I think, is that it is because fear normally presents us with danger that fear is appropriate with respect to dangerous things; in other words, it is appropriate to fear danger because we have to be aware of how things are. And it is appropriate to have an intense fear with respect to an important danger because the function of such a fear is to present a danger of that kind.

More generally, one could say that if x is V, then e (with intensity i) is appropriate with respect to x's being V (to degree d) just if e is a token of t the instances of which normally present x's being V (to degree d) (where 'x' ranges over particulars, 'V' is an evaluative predicate, 'e' an emotion token, 'i' its intensity, 'd' the degree of the value an 't' an emotion type).[36] On this suggestion, emotions are assessed in terms of their correspondence to what they present.

There might seem to be a difficulty here. How can we explain what is meant by the requirement of normality without relying on the concept of appropriateness itself?[37] It is interesting to note that a similar difficulty besets a more Humean suggestion, that is, the suggestion that an emotion is appropriate if and only if it is felt by a good judge.[38] There appears to be no way to explain what a good judge is without making appeal to the explanandum: what makes someone a good judge if not getting things right, i.e., having appropriate emotions?

Yet, should we expect a non-circular explanation of appropriateness? I do not think so. We should keep in mind the fact that 'appropriate' appears to be an evaluative predicate. This should make us suspicious of the demand of non-circularity: we should not expect a reduction of appropriateness to non-evaluative concepts. In other terms, it would be misguided to look for an explanation of the requirement of normality that would dispose of its evaluative character. But then, how can we discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate emotions? My suggestion is that we should distinguish between two endeavours: it is one thing to give a philosophical explanation of appropriateness and another to have the means to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate emotions. We have seen in the preceding

paragraph what could be said as to the former task. As far as I can see, the latter task is not that of philosophy, but that of the practictioners of evaluative language. It is their business to search for the conditions which allow a good grasp of values and what conditions impair our awareness of values. The effect of certain drugs or of mental disease such as depression might have to count as distorting, for instance, but whether they do or not is not a matter to be settled by philosophers.

A closely related point is made by Philip Pettit. He claims that the normal conditions invoked in the elucidation of colour terms have to be defined with respect to a discounting practice: normal conditions are those which have not been discounted in the relevant practice of those who use the terms.[39] The philosopher can do nothing more than register the relation between a concept of that kind and a practice.

It has to be noted that if it is the function of sentiments to present us with evaluative facts, we have a different way of arguing in favour of the claim that evaluative terms have a sentiment-involving sense. As we have seen, Frege emphasizes that the sense of a singular term corresponds to the mode of presentation of its reference. Now if evaluative facts are presented by affective states, and if a fact is the falling of an object under a concept, one can say that evaluative concepts are presented by affective states. If so, the mode of presentation of evaluative concepts involves affective states or sentiments. But then it just follows that terms which refer to evaluative concepts have a sentiment-involving sense. So, the view that sentiments normally present us with evaluative facts entails that the sense of evaluative predicates is sentiment-involving. The converse, however, does not hold: one might well, I think, embrace the view that the sense of evaluative predicates is sentiment-involving without believing that sentiments present us with evaluative facts.

The claim that our awareness of evaluative facts is based on affective states is far from unproblematic. Here are some of the questions which ought to be answered. Is there a proper causal story relating values to our sentiments? Does the fact that there is a wide disparity amongst our affective responses not indicate that it would be wrong to say that such responses present us with anything? Does it make for a problem that apparently contrary to the case of perception, we do not justify our evaluative statements with respect to our sentiments? And would our account not have as a consequence the implausible thesis that any sentiment could present any value? The picture I have sketched so far would have to be completed and defended against objections. Instead of doing so, I shall close with a comment on extension.

VI

Pending a more detailed picture of how affective states represent evaluative facts, the most that can be affirmed at this stage is that there seems to be a way to argue that the truth of evaluative statements is thick and corresponds to thick references. In other words, if the suggestion that we are aware of evaluative facts in virtue of our affective states proves correct, the two requirements can be satisfied. But if there are evaluative concepts, what about their extension? The question is whether or not evaluative concepts are empty. If out of the four possibilities enumerated above only the first is equivalent to realism, this is in fact the real question of realism. For if this is so, it seems that one could accept our story about the sense and reference of evaluative terms while rejecting realism.

As far as I can see, we have reasons to think that most evaluative concepts have an extension. When discussing the beauty of some sonata, for instance, we take ourselves to make claims which are true or false. Indeed, we are often convinced that our evaluative statements are true and correspondingly believe that we really disagree with those who have a different opinion. But if nothing fell under the concept of *beauty*, these intuitions would have to be explained away as illusory by some error-theory à la Mackie.[40] The problem with that kind of account is that it is difficult to see why we should ever choose to fall into error, once we have discovered it.[41] It might be that the error is unavoidable, that even a clear-minded philosopher would be bound to commit it. Still, we should be suspicious of such a theory and should only embrace it we have to. And so far, nothing forces us to do so.[42]

By way of conclusion, let us look back to the four putative possibilities we started with. If what I have said is on the right lines, the first possibility is the one which is realised: evaluative predicates have a sense, a reference and an extension. So, not only does the Fregean framework open our eyes as to interesting possibilities, but it actually allows us to formulate what I take to be a very attractive account of evaluative predicates.

NOTES

[1] Among the few explorers are David Wiggins [31], esp. p. 642, which is a longer version of [30] and from a non-Fregean *perspective*, Darwall, Gibbard and Railton [4].

[2] Cf. for instance [10], pp. 205-6. See Dummett [6] for the textual refutation of the claim that Frege did not want to extend the distinction to the case of predicates.

[3] For this claim, see Frege [8].

[4] For a discussion of these points, see Dummett [6], pp. 211 and following, and Wiggins [28], [33], [32].

Cf. Frege [9]. Thus, it would be wrong to think that Frege viewed the relation between sense and mode of presentation as that of identity.

[6] See Wiggins [28], p. 313, as well as his contribution to this volume.

[7] See Frege [8], pp. 43-4.

[8] For a close suggestion, see Blackburn [1].

[9] It has to be noted that as has been suggested to me by Philip Pettit, one can at least partly transpose these four claims into a non-Fregean terminology. Thus, one could try and equate (Fregean) sense with meaning, (Fregean) reference with possible extension and (Fregean) extension with actual extension. The obtained pattern would come quite close to the Fregean one, were it not be for the third possibility. Indeed, it would be difficult to make sense out of the third possibility: how could a predicate have a meaning without having at least a possible extension? This result would not be unwelcome by neo-Fregeans. See fn. 13.

[10] Note that if concepts are different from properties, and if we stick to the thesis that realism is a claim about properties, it is not clear which possibilities count as realist. Both senses and extensions seem ill-suited to play the role of properties.

[11] Pace Mackie [20], Schiffer [25], p. 602 and Smith [26], p. 289.

[12] This claim needs to be qualified: negative existential such as 'there is nothing beautiful' would be true.

[13] I owe this point to John Biro.

[14] A neo-Fregean would deny this, given that he takes sense to depend on reference. See Evans [7]. For predicates, see Wiggins [28], p. 313, esp. note 9.

[15] This is close to what Schiffer argues. Cf. Schiffer [25].

[16] Wiggins [31], p. 647.

[17] Ibid., p. 644 and p. 646. This definition goes back to G.E. Moore, [22].

[18] Wiggins [31], p. 642.

[19] Johnston's notion of response-dependence is defined along these lines. See Johnston [16]; See also Pettit [23].

[20] See Wiggins [29], p. 187; McDowell [18], esp. p. 118.

[21] Cf. Davies and Humberstone [5] and Wiggins [29], p. 206.

[22] See Wiggins [31], p. 638.

[23] See Hume [14], III, i, 1.

[24] See Wiggins [31], p. 638.

[25] For this last point, see Geach [11], [12]. For the other points, see Blackburn [2] and Wright [34], esp. pp. 30-1.

[26] See Frege [9], p. 48.

[27] It has to be noted that Frege himself would have balked at this: evaluative terms are perfect examples of predicates which are not defined for every argument; 'is generous', for instance, is not defined for inanimate objects, so that one can form sentences with it which have no truth-value. However, given that one can also form sentences which have truth-values, it seems that Frege is wrong to claim that such predicates have no reference. As Dummett notes, the most that we can conclude from such cases is that the concepts referred to are not fully determinate. See Dummett [6], pp. 169-70.

[28] See Wright [34], [35] and Pettit [23] for such a line of thought.

[29] Wright [34], pp. 35-6. For disquotational truth, see Horwich [15].

[30] Pettit [23], esp. pp. 588-9.

[31] For these two requirements, see Wright [34], pp. 37-42. They have their origin in Mackie's argument from disagreement and the epistemological part of the argument from queerness (see [20]). Wright himself adds a third requirement: thick truth need to be about something which is elucidated in a detective biconditional, that is, a biconditional read from right to left. See Wright [34], p. 44-6. I think that consideration of the second requirement settles this issue.

[32] See Wright [34], p. 40.

[33] This suggestion goes back to Scheler [24] and to Meinong [21]. For more recent versions, see McDowell [18], p. 121; de Sousa [27]. See also Hume [13].

[34] McDowell [17], p. 1.

[35] See for instance McNaughton [19], p. 205.

[36] See Meinong [21], pp. 130-1 for a close suggestion.

[37] I am thankful to Hugh Mellor for drawing my attention to this problem.

[38] See Hume [13].

[39] See Pettit [23], p. 603.

[40] See Mackie [20], p. 35.

[41] See Blackburn [3], p. 2.

[42] Schiffer's argument from the possibility of irreducible disagreement to the claim that evaluative properties cannot be instantiated suffers from the fact that he does not consider that the disagreement might be based on a misapprehension of evaluative facts. See Schiffer [25], pp. 608-11.

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