Évolution

Selim Berker, département de philosophie, Harvard University

Quand :
22 mars 2013 @ 10:00 – 12:00
2013-03-22T10:00:00-04:00
2013-03-22T12:00:00-04:00
Où :
Salle 309
2910 Boulevard Edouard-Montpetit
Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC H3T
Canada

Dans le cadre des ateliers du GRIN

Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Reasons for Action Are Mind-Dependent?

Abstract :

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls « normative realism, » I argue that there are two largely independent lines of argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it.