/home/lecreumo/public html/wp content/uploads/2019/02/capture décran le 2019 04 12 à 12.41.41

Consent and Truth-Telling / Consentement et Vérité

Consent and Truth-Telling Conference

McGill University, Montreal

Keynote speakers: 

Prof. Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna)
Prof. Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)
Prof. Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

The notion of consent is, in many ways, central to ethics. Consent, it is thought, can licence things done to a person by another agent that would otherwise—that is, if consent was lacking—be deemed wrong. For instance, medical practitioners will seek to secure consent from their patients before completing medical procedures because not doing so would jeopardize their patients’ autonomy. Similarly, we think that consent is what can make sexual interactions or relationships permissible or legitimate. Some authors also believe that consent of the governed is required to legitimate political authority. Consent, however, is not as straightforward a notion as it may seem. What constitutes consent? What is it about consent that makes it a good- or right-making feature of actions, interactions and relationships? In practice, many factors can complicate our interpretation of acts of consent. Consent is often times tacit and assumed, instead of explicitly given. Individuals can also be coerced and manipulated into acts of consent, but they can also find themselves in situations where certain norms or pressure will result in them consenting either against their genuine preferences or for the wrong kind of reasons. Or, consent could result from situations where a person is not told the truth about what she is consenting to or where she is not telling herself the truth about what she would prefer to consent to (or not). It seems, then, that acts of consent should not always be taken at face value and that it should maybe not hold as central a place in our ethical and political imaginary. Could there be, then, any crucial relation between the notion of consent and that of truth-telling?

This conference, which is organized by the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ), aims at bringing together scholars who work in normative ethics, medical ethics and political philosophy to explore the normative significance of consent, its relation to truth-telling, and its role in medical and political contexts.

Affiche (.pdf)

Organizing committee: Julie Allard; Stanislav Birko; Kelsey Brady; Audrey Ghali-Lachapelle; Éliot Litalien; Martina Orlandi.

Lunch and coffee/tea will be provided free of charge, but registration is required. To register, please do so by email at eliot.litalien@mail.mcgill.ca.

Preliminary Programme
9:00-9:05 Welcome Remarks
9:05-11:05 Fundamental Ethics
9:05-10:05 Keynote speaker: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University)
10:05-10:35 Marie-Hélène Desmeules (The New School for Social Research)

“Did ‘Yes’ Truly Mean ‘Yes’? The Practical Commitment Presupposed by the Act of Consent”

10:35-11:05 Shaun Miller (Marquette University)

“Sexual Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to Power in Sexual Consent”

11:05-11:20 Coffee break
11:20-1:20 Ethics and Politics
11:20-12:20 Keynote speaker: Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

“Consent, Respect, and Identity: Shaping Children Without Their Permission”

12:20-12:50 Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)

“A Historical Account of Sweatshop Exploitation”

12:50-1:20 Graeme O’Farrell (Carleton University)

“On The Problem of Consent for Established States in Locke’s Second Treatise

1:20-2:20 Lunch
2:20-4:20 Medical Ethics
2:20-3:20 Keynote speaker: Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna)

“Consent and Truth Telling: A Collective Agency Perspective

3:20-3:50 Anna Gotlib (Brooklyn College, CUNY)

“The Patient As Liminal Knower: Power(lessness) and Consent in an American Hospital”

3:50-4:20 Em Walsh (McGill University)

“The Moral Permissibility of Non-Consensual Sex for Dementia Patients”

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Conférence Consentement et Vérité

Conférencier.ère.s invité.e.s:

Prof. Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna)
Prof. Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)
Prof. Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

La notion de consentement est, à différents égards, centrale à l’éthique. Le consentement, pense-t-on, peut légitimer des actes faits à une personne par un autre agent qui seraient autrement – c’est-à-dire, en l’absence de consentement – jugées immoraux. Les médecins, par exemple, vont chercher à obtenir le consentement de leurs patients avant d’entreprendre une procédure médicale, parce que ne pas le faire mettrait en jeu l’autonomie de leurs patients. De façon similaire, on pense que le consentement est ce qui peut rendre les relations sexuelles légitimes. Certains auteurs croient également que le consentement des gouvernés est requis pour légitimer l’autorité politique. Cependant, il n’est pas si simple de définir la notion de consentement. Qu’est-ce qui constitue un acte de consentement? Qu’est-ce qui fait du consentement quelque chose qui peut rendre des actions et des interactions bonnes ou justes? En pratique, plusieurs facteurs peuvent compliquer notre interprétation d’actes de consentement. Le consentement est souvent tacite ou présumé plutôt qu’exprimé explicitement. Les individus peuvent être contraints ou manipulés à consentir, mais ils peuvent aussi se retrouver dans des situations où certaines normes ou pressions les feront consentir à l’encontre de leurs véritables préférences ou pour le mauvais type de raison. Plus encore, le consentement pourrait résulter de situations où une personne ne dit pas la vérité ou ne se dit pas la vérité à elle-même à propos de ce à quoi elle préférerait consentir (ou non). Il semble ainsi que les actes de consentement ne devraient pas toujours être pris au pied de la lettre et ne devraient peut-être pas occuper une place aussi centrale dans notre imaginaire éthique et politique. Pourrait-il y avoir, donc, une relation cruciale entre les notions de consentement et de vérité?

Cette conférence, organisée par le Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ), vise à réunir des chercheurs qui travaillent en éthique normative, en éthique médicale et en philosophie politique pour explorer la signification normative de la notion de consentement, sa relation à la vérité et son rôle dans les contextes médicaux et politiques.

Affiche (.pdf)

Comité organisateur: Julie Allard; Stanislav Birko; Kelsey Brady; Audrey Ghali-Lachapelle; Éliot Litalien; Martina Orlandi.

Le lunch et le café/thé sont offerts gratuitement, mais l’inscription est exigée. Pour s’inscrire, contactez Éliot Litalien à l’adresse eliot.litalien@mail.mcgill.ca.

Programme
9:00-9:05 Accueil
9:05-11:05 Fundamental Ethics
9:05-10:05 Keynote speaker: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University)
10:05-10:35 Marie-Hélène Desmeules (The New School for Social Research)

“Did ‘Yes’ Truly Mean ‘Yes’? The Practical Commitment Presupposed by the Act of Consent”

10:35-11:05 Shaun Miller (Marquette University)

“Sexual Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to Power in Sexual Consent”

11:05-11:20 Pause café
11:20-1:20 Ethics and Politics
11:20-12:20 Keynote speaker: Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

“Consent, Respect, and Identity: Shaping Children Without Their Permission”

12:20-12:50 Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)

“A Historical Account of Sweatshop Exploitation”

12:50-1:20 Graeme O’Farrell (Carleton University)

“On The Problem of Consent for Established States in Locke’s Second Treatise

1:20-2:20 Lunch
2:20-4:20 Medical Ethics
2:20-3:20 Keynote speaker: Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna)

“Consent and Truth Telling: A Collective Agency Perspective

3:20-3:50 Anna Gotlib (Brooklyn College, CUNY)

“The Patient As Liminal Knower: Power(lessness) and Consent in an American Hospital”

3:50-4:20 Em Walsh (McGill University)

“The Moral Permissibility of Non-Consensual Sex for Dementia Patients”

Source de l’image.