Rossi2

Mauro Rossi

Professeur de philosophie à l’Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM).

Postes occupés

2008-2009 à 2009-2010 Stagiaire postdoctoral-e
2010-2011 Chercheur-e associé-e,
2011-2012 à 2013-2014 Chercheur-e associé-e,
2014-2015 à aujourd'hui Membre régulier-ère,

Biographie

I am an Associate Professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). Before joining UQAM in 2010, I completed a PhD in Philosophy at the London School of Economics in 2009, under the supervision of Richard Bradley, and spent two years (2008-2010) as a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal (CRÉUM).

My research interests are in value theory, normative ethics and the philosophy of economics. More specifically, I am currently working on four projects.

  1. Wellbeing and Happiness (with Christine Tappolet)

In this project, we pursue three main goals. First, we provide an analysis of the concept good for, which is crucial for understanding the concept of wellbeing. Second, we develop a new eudemonistic account of wellbeing in terms of fitting happiness. In order to do this, we defend a novel version of the emotional theory of happiness, according to which the latter consists in an overall positive affective experience of values. Finally, we offer an account of the relation between wellbeing and virtues, which emphasizes the constitutive relation between emotions and virtues.

  1. Interpersonal Comparisons of Wellbeing

In this project, I address the main philosophical questions raised by interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing. What is the meaning of interpersonal comparison statements? Are there any facts about interpersonal comparisons? Can we know, or have justified beliefs about, how different people’s wellbeing compare? My goal is to vindicate the role that interpersonal comparisons play in normative economics, social choice theory and moral theory.

  1. The Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Comparative Value

According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value, to judge that an item is good is to judge that that item is a fitting object of a favorable attitude. My aim in this project is to extend the fitting-attitude analysis and to offer an account of comparative value relations (i.e. ‘betterness’, ‘equality’, ‘worseness’, ‘parity’), value degrees and of the more general notions of value comparability and value incomparability.

  1. Animal Ethics and the Problem of Animal Predation (with Andrée-Anne Cormier)

Traditional animal ethical theories typically follow a “top-down” approach, which consists in deductively applying theoretical precepts to practical issues. We believe that this approach fails to deliver convincing answers to some important problems, most notably, the problem of animal predation. In this project, we develop a more “bottom-up” approach, which moves from the solution to the previous problems to the elaboration of a new comprehensive animal ethical theory. 

PUBLICATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Articles

  • “Virtue, Happiness, and Wellbeing” (with Christine Tappolet), accepted for publication in The Monist.
  • “Value and Preference Relations: Are They Symmetric?”, forthcoming in Utilitas.
  • “Emotions and Wellbeing” (with Christine Tappolet), 2015, Topoi, 34(2): 461-474.
  • “Simulation Theory and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons Reconsidered”, 2014, Synthese, 191(6): 1185-1210.
  • “Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences”, 2014, Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum, 9(2): 82-98.
  • “Transcendental Arguments and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”, 2011, Economics and Philosophy, 27(3): 273-295.
  • “L’éthique de la vertu et le critère de l’action correcte” (with Martin Gibert), 2011, Dialogue 50(2): 367-390.
  • “Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction”, 2011, Utilitas, 23(3): 316-323.
  • “Comparing Preferences“, 2009, mente, 10: 93-110.

Book Chapters

  • “What is value? Where does it come from? A philosophical perspective” (with Christine Tappolet), 2015, in J. Deonna, T. Brosch and D. Sander (dir.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation, pp. 3-22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Non Peer-Reviewed Articles

  • « Normativity and Normative Psychology: Introduction », 2012, Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum, 7: 141-145.

Edited Journal Issues

  • Rossi, M. (dir.) 2012, Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum. Special volume on: “Normativity and Normative Psychology”, 7: 141-252.
  • Rossi, M. & Beritelli, L. (dir.) 2009. mente. Special volume on: “Philosophy of Economics”, 10: 1-240.

Book Reviews

  • Review of Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, 2013, Dialectica, 67(2): 257-264

Pour la version en français, voir ma page institutionnelle