|2017-2018 à aujourd'hui||Direction d'axe, Éthique fondamentale|
|2008-2009 à 2009-2010||Stagiaire postdoctoral-e|
|2010-2011||Chercheur-e associé-e, Éthique et économie|
|2011-2012 à 2013-2014||Chercheur-e associé-e, Éthique fondamentale|
|2014-2015 à aujourd'hui||Membre régulier-ère, Éthique fondamentale|
Participations aux événements du CRÉ
I am an Associate Professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). Before joining UQAM in 2010, I completed a PhD in Philosophy at the London School of Economics in 2009, under the supervision of Richard Bradley, and spent two years (2008-2010) as a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal (CRÉUM).
My research interests are in value theory and prudential psychology. More specifically, I am currently working on three projects.
- Wellbeing and Happiness (with Christine Tappolet)
In this project, we pursue four main goals. First, we provide an analysis of the concept good for, which is crucial for understanding the concept of wellbeing. Second, we develop a new eudemonistic account of wellbeing in terms of fitting happiness. In order to do this, we defend an affective theory of happiness, according to which the latter consists in an overall positive affective experience of values. Third, we develop a general account of affective states such as emotions, moods and sensory pleasures, as well as of the nature of affectivity. Finally, we offer an account of the relation between wellbeing and virtues, which emphasizes the constitutive relation between emotions and virtues.
- The Nature and Value of Childhood (with Andrée-Anne Cormier)
Our goal in this project is to develop an account of the nature and value of childhood. The main questions we consider are the following. What is a child? Is being a child a bad, neutral or good state to be in? In what sense, if any, does children’s wellbeing differ from adults’ wellbeing? What determines the overall value of childhood?
- The Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Comparative Value
According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value, to judge that an item is good is to judge that that item is a fitting object of a favorable attitude. My aim in this project is to extend the fitting-attitude analysis and to offer an account of comparative value relations (i.e. ‘betterness’, ‘equality’, ‘worseness’, ‘parity’), value degrees and of the more general notions of value comparability and value incomparability.
Pour la version en français, voir ma page institutionnelle