Olson

Jonas Olson

Docent (Reader), Research Fellow, and University Lecturer (on leave) in Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University, September 2008 – present. Ph.D. Practical Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden 2005.

Postes occupés

2012-2013 Chercheur-e invité-e,
2014-2015 à aujourd'hui Membre collaborateur-trice,

Biographie

At CRÉUM: 22 April to 20 May 2013.

Research Areas

Metaethics and related subjects.

Academic Background

  • Docent (Reader), Research Fellow, and University Lecturer (on leave) in Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University, September 2008 – present.
  • Tutorial Fellow, Brasenose College; Departmental Lecturer, University of Oxford, September 2005 – September 2008.
  • Visiting Fellow, Yale University, autumn 2005.
  • Ph.D. in Practical Philosophy, Uppsala University, May 2005.
  • Assistant Lecturer, University of Otago, New Zealand, September 2004 – March 2005.
  • M.A. in Practical Philosophy, Lund University, January 2001.

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Books

  • Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (under contract with Oxford University Press).
  • The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (co-edited with Iwao Hirose, under contract with Oxford University Press).

Journal Articles

  1. ‘Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic?’ Inquiry 45 (2002): 89-96.
  2. ‘Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 412-22.
  3. ‘A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict’ (with Frans Svensson). Utilitas 15 (2003): 194-2005.
  4. ‘Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism about Final Value’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004): 31-52.
  5. ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 295-300.
  6. ‘Regimenting Reasons’ (with Frans Svensson). Theoria 71 (2005): 203-14.
  7. ‘G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006): 525-34.
  8. ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’ (with Sven Danielsson). Mind 116 (2007): 511-22.
  9. ‘Expressivism and Moral Certitude’ (with Krister Bykvist). Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2009): 202-15.
  10. ‘Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism’. In S. Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford: OUP, 2009: 164-82.
  11. ‘Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2009): 365-78.
  12. ‘The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’. Utilitas 21 (2009): 225-32.
  13. ‘In Defence of Moral Error Theory’. In M. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010: 62-84.
  14. ‘The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It’. Ratio 23 (2010): 87-101.
  15. ‘A. C. Ewing’s First and Second Thoughts on Metaethics’ (with Mark Timmons). In T. Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford: OUP, 2011: 183-211.
  16. ‘Error Theory and Reasons for Belief’. In A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen (eds), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge: CUP, 2011: 75-93.
  17. ‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’. In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 6. Oxford. OUP, 2011: 181-204.
  18. ‘Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 192-200. (Invited conribution to a book symposium on John Skorupski’s The Domain of Reasons.)
  19. ‘Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics’, forthcoming in Hume Studies.
  20. Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude’ (with Krister Bykvist), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2012).
  21.  ‘The Personal and the Fitting: Critical Review of Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value’, forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy.
  22. ‘Mackie’s Motivational Queerness Argument Reconsidered’, forthcoming in The Internatonal Journal for the Study of Skepticism. (Invited contribution to a special issue on moral skepticism.)
  23. ‘The Metaphysics of Reasons’. Forthcoming in D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  24. ‘Skepticism about Value’. Forthcoming in I. Hirose & J. Olson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

Encyclopaedia Entries

  1. ‘Buck-Passing Accounts’ (5000 words). Forthcoming in H. La Follette (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
  2. ‘A. C. Ewing’ (with Mark Timmons, 3000 words). Forthcoming in LaFollette (ed.).
  3. ‘Metaethics’ (7000 words). Forthcoming in LaFollette (ed.).

Non-Peer-Reviewed Publications (Selection)

  1. ‘Sorting Out Reason: On Stoutlands Criticism of the Belief Desire Model’ (with Frans Svensson). In K. Segerberg & R. Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasboard: Essays in Honour of Frederick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52, 2003: 143-50. (Predecessor of item 6 in the above list.)
  2. ‘A Question about Supervenience and Value-Making Properties’. In W. Rabinowicz & T. Rönnow-Rasmussen (eds.). Patterns of Value: Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis vol. 1. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2003: 130-37.
  3. ‘Brentano on Pleasure’. Ibid: 138-43.
  4. ‘Buck-Passing and the Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction’. In D. Egonsson, J. Josfesson, B. Petersson, & T. Rönnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Hommage a Wlodek: Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wlodek Rabinowicz. Lund University, 2007.
  5. ‘Mackie’s Motivational Argument from Queerness Revisited’. In R. Sliwinski & F. Svensson (eds.), Neither/Nor: Philosophucal Essays Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of his Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 58, 2011.

Reviews

  1. Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. Economics and Philosophy 22 (2006): 171-77.
  2. Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2006).
  3. Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 540-42.
  4. Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy. Analysis 69 (2009): 190-92.

Publications in Swedish

  1. ‘Om värdebärare och värdereduktion’. Filosofisk tidskrift 1/2002: 43-54.
  2. ‘Partikularistisk konsekventialism’ (med Frans Svensson). Filosofisk tidskrift 3/2004.
  3. ‘Om moraliska övertygelsers styrka och emotivismens svaghet: Replik till Danielsson’ (with Krister Bykvist). Filosofisk tidskrift 4/2010: 16-24.
  4. Review of Bo Sandelin, Adam Smith. Tidskrift för politisk filosofi 2011: 51-57.
  5. ‘Förnuft och känsla: Rationalism, sentimentalism och Humes metaetik’. In R. Callergård (ed.), Förnuft, känsla och moral: Perspektiv på David Hume. Stockholm: Thales, 2011.