Federica Berdini
Postes occupés
| 2021-2022 à 2022-2023 | Représentant-e des chercheur-ses postdoctoraux-les, Éthique fondamentale |
| 2020-2021 à 2021-2022 | Chercheur-se postdoctoral-e, Éthique fondamentale |
Participations aux événements du CRÉ
| 23 novembre 2020 | « Indifference to Racism and Moral Responsibility » |
|---|---|
| 19 mai 2021 | Resilience in Action and Belief |
| 28 avril 2021 | ANNULÉ! A Place for Coping in Action Theory |
| 29 mars 2022 | « Outline of a Philosophical Theory of Coping » |
| 28 avril 2022 | Annual Transatlantic Workshop in Practical Philosophy |
| 26 avril 2023 | « Radical and critical approaches to understanding and supporting mental health » |
Thèmes Phares
Biographie
I obtained my PhD at the University of Bologna under the supervision of Professor Carla Bagnoli. During my doctoral studies, I was a visiting fellow at Harvard University and the University of Vienna. Since completing my PhD, I have been a part-time lecturer at the Ted Rogers School of Management at Toronto Metropolitan University, and a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Practical Philosophy and Ethics at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich.
My research focuses on human agency and its societal and interpersonal recognition and attribution, and brings together ethics, philosophical and moral psychology, as well as feminist and social philosophy.
During my postdoctoral fellowship at the CRÉ, GRIN, and CREF, and under the supervision of Christine Tappolet, Katharina Nieswandt, and Naïma Hamrouni, I made progress on three projects. My most recent project, titled “The Nature and Ethics of Coping”, aims at providing a philosophical account of the phenomenon of coping that will serve as a basis to explore its ethical implications. The second project is a series of co-authored papers (with Sofia Bonicalzi) on racism and moral responsibility. Starting from instances of racism in contemporary Italy, we address issues of moral responsibility for explicit and implicit manifestations of racism in cases where different kinds of ignorance (factual, moral, constitutive) are involved. The third project develops the Authorship View of agency in a socially situated and interactionist direction and provides an explanation of cases of “socially displaced agency,” in which the intended meaning of actions performed by agents belonging to oppressed groups gets a distorted uptake within society.
Recent publications:
“Normalization of Racism and Moral Responsibility: Against the Exculpatory Stance.” (with S. Bonicalzi) Journal of Applied Philosophy (forthcoming) doi: 10.1111/japp.12630
