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Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory

Quand :
24 avril 2019 @ 12:00 – 13:15
Où :
Salle 309, Stone Castle
2910 Édouard-Montpetit

Vous êtes invité.e.s à participer à une discussion consacrée à un article préparé par François Jaquet et intitulé « Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory ».

Format de la rencontre:

Sur demande (valery.giroux@umontreal.ca), l’article vous sera envoyé afin que vous puissiez le lire à l’avance. François ne présentera pas ses arguments. La réunion servira plutôt à lui faire part de vos commentaires, questions et critiques. 


Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory

According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false: it is false that stealing is wrong, that donating to charity is right, and that parents must not beat their kids. Until recently, most moral error theorists were local error theorists. They targeted only moral judgments and were less skeptical about other normative judgments—in particular, they believed in the existence of prudential truths, such as “You should eat five fruits and vegetables a day.” These error theorists now face prudential parity objections, that is, objections based on the claim that whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. These objections come from two opposite directions: while some of their proponents take this claim to be a reason to reject the moral error theory, others take it to be a reason to accept a prudential error theory—and, more generally, an error theory about the whole normative realm. In this paper, I defend the local moral theory against three parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons (Fletcher, 2018); another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons (Cline, 2018); and yet another on the very nature of reasons (Bedke, 2009).